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The DoD acquisition community frequently reports that micromanagement and
overregulation reduce acquisition efficiency. The Defense Enterprise Program (DEP)
was an initiative approved by Congress in response to Packard Commission
recommendations to improve the acquisition process. The DEP initiative allowed
DoD to experimentally reduce regulatory requirements, streamline the acquisition
management structure and provide fiscal stability to DoD programs. However, the
initiative failed to provide significant benefits for the designated programs. The
causes of the DEP failure fell into these three broad categories; 1) Managerial failures
in implementation 2) Failure to address organizational resistance to reduced
oversight and 3) Political dynamics of DoD acquisition reform. This study analyzes
the difference between congressional intent and DoD execution of the DEP as well as
the impediments to effective DEP implementation. It also examines the
characteristics of the DoD acquisition organization and the relationships between
DoD and Congress while assessing the impact on the ability to reform DoD
acquisition. Lessons learned from the DEP failure may provide insight on the
political dynamics of organizational change and enhance the opportunity for
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This thesis examines one element of acquisition reform related to the
complex, ever-changing relationship between Congress and the Department of
Defense (DoD). Members of Congress and DoD are charged with oversight of
what is oftentimes perceived as an inefficient, acquisition process. The
following characterization of DoD acquisition is offered by Augustine and
Adelman in The Defense Revolution :
The Department of Defense spends about $150 billion each year in 15 million
separate contract actions, or about two per second. These actions are carried
out by more than 150,000 government acquisition personnel and another
300,000 supporting government personnel using 30,000 pages of regulations
issued by 79 different offices. The process is overseen by 29 congressional
committees with 55 subcommittees and 28,000 staff members. In one recent
year, the Pentagon was required to respond to 120,000 written requests for
information from Congress plus 600,000 telephone inquiries from Capitol
Hill, all while supplying 1,300 witnesses who gave 1,500 hours of testimony
at 450 hearings-much of it relating to the procurement process. This activity
is monitored in minute detail by 26,000 auditors and assisted by the
Washington Post. [Ref. l:p. 129]
Reformers continually modify the acquisition process with the intent of
improving its fiscal and managerial efficiency. In 1985, reformers contended
that because of past reform efforts, the process had become "overburdened
with unnecessary management layers, excessive delays in program decision
approval, inordinate redirection in programs and cumbersome and often
inconsistent oversight and regulation." [Ref. 2:p. 59] The reform agenda is not
new. Reformers in 1985 believed that acquisition streamlining was a solution
to correct some inefficiency.
The Defense Enterprise Program (DEP) was one reform created in 1986 by
Congress in response to recommendations made by the Packard Commission.
Congress subsequently authorized the Defense Enterprise Program in the 1987
Defense Authorization Act as a streamlining experiment for selected DoD
acquisition programs. Members of Congress hoped to use the benefits
obtained by the DEPs to justify implementation of the streamlining concept in
acquisition programs DoD-wide. [Ref. 3:p. 257] The DEP was fashioned to
make the authority and accountability of DoD program managers comparable
to their civilian equivalents by:
1. reducing unnecessary regulatory and reporting
requirements
2. utilizing a streamlined management structure to
reduce excessive oversight
3. utilizing milestone-to-milestone funding to improve
fiscal stability and improve managerial and fiscal efficiency
The initiative, although hailed by Congress and those in the acquisition
field, did not produce significant regulatory or reporting relief or improve
managerial or fiscal efficiency for most of the DEPs. Some program managers
actually reported an increase in regulation and micromanagement although
reforms similar to the DEP have been instituted to combat them. [Ref. 41
DEPs have sustained the interest of Congress. The Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) recently addressed the DEP in its report on the 1992-93
National Defense Authorization Act. It criticized DoD for its unwillingness to
implement the initiative and lauded the potential merit of DEP concepts. The
SASC promised to continue giving the support necessary to achieve effective
implementation of the DEP in DoD programs. [Ref. 5]
As defense budgets decline drastically, acquisition fiscal and managerial
efficiency must be increased to squeeze the most from the procurement dollars
available. The deleterious effects of over-regulation and micromanagement
infringe on acquisition efficiency and the efficient utilization of the limited
resources expected in the future.
The fate of the DEP provides an example of the complex political,
organizational and budgetary interrelationships within DoD and between
Congress and DoD officials. This thesis examines the dynamics of DEP
implementation and execution to determine the reasons for its lackluster
results. Analysis of these impediments provides an understanding of some
pitfalls that may be encountered when implementing a reform within DoD. It
also provides an additional characterization of the relationship between DoD
acquisition policy-makers and Congress. This thesis attempts to develop
insight on the difficulty of implementing reforms in DoD for officials within
the acquisition and budget hierarchy who may be directed by Congress to
implement this or similar reforms in the future.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question of this thesis is:
Why hasn't implementation of the Defense Enterprise Program
reduced overregulation and micromanagement?
The following secondary research questions are also relevant
to this investigation:
Is a congressional "hands off or management-by-exception
program possible for DoD?
Can the DEP help to accomplish staff reductions by taking
advantage of reduced regulatory and reporting
requirements?
Is it feasible to expect the DEP to provide relief from
over-regulation and unnecessary reporting in the future?
How can DoD effectively accomplish implementation if
Congress mandates utilization of DEP concepts in the future?
C. SCOPE OF STUDY, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis examines historical acquisition reforms as background and then
analyzes the effects of the regulatory and oversight requirements imposed by
Congress and the military organization on the program management office.
Data from the program manager point of view is analyzed to determine if any
reduction in oversight or increase in authority or accountability occurred while
operating under the authority of the DEP initiative. The evolution,
implementation and outcome of the DEP is compared to congressional goals
for the initiative to offer insight into the fiscal, regulatory and oversight
relationships between Congress and DoD. Conclusions are drawn from
analysis of the implementation, execution and outcome of the DEP.
The thesis does not investigate the effects of military requirements
(MILSPEC/MILSTD) or FAR/DFAR regulations on managerial efficiency.
Research is confined to the management of programs, after the decision to
proceed with acquisition has been made.
It is assumed that the reader has a basic understanding of the DoD
acquisition process, program management functions, DoD terminology and the
legislative and budget processes.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research was conducted through a combination of comprehensive
literature reviews and field interviews. The Naval Postgraduate School library
maintains DoD instructions /guidance, GAO reports, Congressional
Authorization Acts/Reports and other publications which was used to
accumulate the basic research of the thesis. An exhaustive search of the
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) service and Defense
Systems Management College studies provided additional data for analysis.
Defense and trade journal articles, in addition to personal interviews, were
used to compare the declared goals of the initiative to perceptions and
outcomes of the DEP. Interviews with program management staff, personnel
in the military acquisition hierarchy and congressional staff members provided
a substantial portion of the data for this thesis.
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter I introduces the thesis
subject, sets forth the thesis questions and scope and describes the
methodology of researching the thesis.
Chapter II provides a general background for DoD acquisition. The themes
of the DEP are traced through each of the major reform efforts of the last
decade. The chapter also explores the acquisition oversight role of Congress.
Finally, the chapter describes the acquisition climate within DoD to underscore
the need for creation of a reform with characteristics like the DEP.
Chapter III details the genesis of the DEP. The intent of Congress and
original and enabling DEP legislation are analyzed to provide insight into the
differences between the initial concept, congressional intent and final legislated
form. A brief description of the initial DoD response highlights the
ineffectiveness of the DEP.
Chapter IV analyzes the causes of the failure of the DEP. It looks into four
broad causal areas that hindered the implementation and execution of the
DEP. Events and circumstances that affected implementation each of the three
DEP pillars are presented to demonstrate the difficulty encountered by the
DEP.
Chapter V presents facts and analysis that support the question of whether
the DEP is still a viable tool for DoD to use to improve the efficiency of the
acquisition process. Factors that support and threaten this viability lead to a
conclusion concerning DEP revitalization.
Chapter VI draws conclusions from the analysis presented in the research.
The answers to the research questions posed in chapter I and, in conclusion,
presents pitfalls to which any reform may succumb. Areas for additional
research are also included in the final chapter.
II. BACKGROUND
It is increasingly evident that barriers to improving the
acquisition process derive, not from a lack of ideas, but
from the difficulties encountered by senior government
managers (in Congress as well as in the Defense
Department) in identifying and changing
counterproductive government and industry incentives.
-J.R. Fox
The Defense Management Challenge
A. INTRODUCTION
The need for regulatory and reporting reform has existed since DoD
formalized its acquisition procedures more than 30 years ago. The importance
of reform increased during the period of unconstrained, bureaucratic growth
which commenced in the early 1960's and continued with some lapses through
the mid-1 980's. Numerous studies and reform efforts were commissioned to
analyze and recommend changes in the acquisition process to correct specific
problems. These recommendations frequently took the form of legislative,
regulatory or other policy proposals.
Figure 1 depicts the numerous studies and commissions that have analyzed
defense acquisition since WWII. In the majority of these efforts, regulatory
and reporting reform and fiscal instability received specific emphasis.
Identification of problems with defense acquisition appears to have reached
a zenith in the mid 1980's. Widely-acknowledged acquisition inefficiencies
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were not attributable to single events or occurrences. It became generally
accepted from the critics' perspective that the acquisition process had eroded
and had become inflexible and inefficient as a result of years of tinkering and
"guidance" (additional regulatory or reporting requirements) by OSD, the
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Figure 1
SOURCE: [Ref. 27:p. 125]
In 1988, General Edward Hirsh and Dr. Fred Waelchli offered this
characterization of the reasons for and symptoms of this tinkering:
The defense acquisition system does its work—millions of transactions that
consume billions of the taxpayers' dollars every year—in the intense light of
public scrutiny. This is as it should be. But this scrutiny (well-intentioned
or otherwise) is seldom performed at the level of strategic goals and
objectives, nor is it focused on systemic inadequacies or flaws in the process
itself. Too often, the oversight of critical review is triggered by some jolting
event: an actual or perceived anomaly or an instance of waste, fraud or
abuse; and the analysis is conducted at the level of the visible symptoms.
The resulting actions are almost always quick-fix solutions, designed to
repair the most recent specific defect. Even those solutions developed more
deliberatively rarely consider the total national defense picture. [Ref. 6:p. 65]
A review of 1) major reform efforts that occurred during the 1980's 2) the
influence of Congress over the acquisition process and 3) the general climate
of acquisition demonstrates that past reform efforts generally were not very
successful in improving the managerial efficiency of DoD acquisition
programs. This absence of success supported the rationale for creation of the
Defense Enterprise Program.
B. REGULATORY AND REPORTING REFORMS OVER THE LAST
DECADE
The internal effects of a mutable policy are calamitous. It
will be of little avail. . . if the laws (are) so voluminous
that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot
be understood: if they (are) . . . revised before they are
promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no




Headline-hungry news reporters have been quick to recount the errors of
defense acquisition. DoD awards nearly 60,000 contracts every day. If only
one, one-hundredth of one percent (.0001) of these provide the sensationalistic
material for which the press clamors, they would still have six "scandals" per
day to report. On many occasions, these errors are discovered and disclosed
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by the offending firms or DoD auditors. In the majority of cases, criminal
intent is absent. Rather, confusing accounting rules or other complexities are
often to blame. [Ref. 8:p. 31]
1. Carlucci Initiatives
In the early 1980's, President Ronald Reagan, promised to rebuild the
armed forces and the civilian infrastructure to support them. To further this
end, his Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Casper Weinberger, and Deputy
Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF), Frank Carlucci, embarked on a vigorous
campaign to improve the efficiency of the defense acquisition process. They
sought to change the acquisition strategies of previous Secretaries of Defense,
that relied on centralized acquisition management by implementing policies
that exploited what they called "controlled-decentralization". They were
attempting to modify DoD culture by holding program managers accountable
for managing the broad policy decisions made by OSD without excessive top-
down oversight. [Ref. 8:p. 47]
DEPSECDEF Carlucci chartered five working groups in 1981, to review
the entire acquisition process and recommend changes. Their review focused
on providing practical, long and short term solutions. They strived to include
suggestions from the military departments as well as industry.
In April 1981, the groups published their results—31 directives broadly
titled "The Defense Acquisition Improvement Program" (AIP). DEPSECDEF
Carlucci later added another concept to the plan which generally became
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known as the Carlucci Initiatives. Five separate initiatives attempted to
provide program managers with regulatory and /or reporting relief. Appendix
A provides a list of all 32 initiatives.
Two of the thirty-two initiatives specifically involved reducing or
eliminating excessive regulation. They were: 1) Governmental Legislation
Related to Acquisition and 2) Reduce the Number of DoD Directives
(numbers 13 and 14 respectively). The core concept of these initiatives was the
widely-believed and historically-proven managerial philosophy that
overregulation thwarts managerial efficiency (which increases the cost to the
government).
a. Initiative number 13 entitled "Governmental Legislation Related to
Acquisition" requested government agencies to refrain from imposing laws,
language and /or policy that unnecessarily burdened the acquisition or
contracting process. DEPSECDEF Carlucci believed that "we badly need
legislative relief from a multiplicity of laws that impede our ability to follow
sound business practices." [Ref. 9:p. 7]
b. Initiative number 14 entitled "Reduce the Number of DoD Directives"
was aimed at OSD and the military department proliferation of acquisition
regulations. It called for a cost-benefit analysis of the existing rules and
regulations to determine which were essential and which were non value-
added (and therefore, unnecessary). This initiative also promised responsible,
cost-beneficial regulations in the future. New procedures would be
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implemented that required the DAE to be the sole issuer of all future
acquisition related directives to ensure their merit exceeded their "cost".
DEPSECDEF Carlucci's call for a return to sound business practices
indicated his belief that the system had lost its managerial flexibility and
efficiency. In light of the above recommendations, DEPSECDEF Carlucci
directed a bottom-up review of existing regulations and sought to impose an
additional hurdle in the regulatory-approval process to discourage
implementation of future regulatory restrictions. [Ref. 9:p. 8]
It is apparent that DEPSECDEF Carlucci's working groups found an
overregulated and overlegislated system. But, they also found that acquisition
procedures did not vaguely resemble those of the private sector. Three
initiatives, number 1 entitled "Management Principles", number 10 entitled
"Reduce the Administration Cost and Time to Procure Items" and number 17
called "Decrease DSARC Briefing and Data Requirements", dealt with reporting
and /or oversight and sought to model the DoD process after private-sector
practices.
c. Initiative number 1 focused primarily on providing the lower tiers of
acquisition management with appropriate levels of responsibility, authority
and accountability, modeling the defense acquisition process after the private
sector as much as possible. In a 1981 article published in Program Manager,
Mr Carlucci reported that he was ". . . convinced that the free enterprise
system operates better and more efficiently with a minimum of micro-
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management from us." [Ref. 9:p. 5] His convictions reappeared five years later
as the conceptual basis of the DEP.
d. Initiatives numbers 10 and 17 are also modeled after private-sector
management practices. They represent attempts to streamline the acquisition
process by requesting a "validity scrub" of all paperwork, data requirements
and reviews dealing with oversight. These concepts are also conspicuously
present in the DEP implementing guidance.
The next DEPSECDEF, Mr Paul Thayer, was entrusted with continued
implementation of the AIP. While reporting on the progress of the AIP in
1983, he consolidated Carlucci' s 32 initiatives into six major groups. He
deliberately included only 12 of the original 32 initiatives, deciding to
concentrate his efforts and support on those few rather than diffuse his
support on all 32. [Ref. 10:p. 2] This strategy unfortunately shifted the focus
away from regulatory and reporting reform by excluding the five initiatives
described above. This was done because DEPSECDEF Thayer considered
regulatory and reporting reforms to be proceeding "on-track". [Ref. 10:p. 2]
A 1986 GAO survey of the status of the Carlucci Initiatives provided
results which contradicted DEPSECDEF Thayer's belief. The GAO report
announced that more than half of the 54 "seasoned" program managers that
GAO interviewed, experienced little or no regulatory or reporting relief as a
result of the Carlucci Initiatives. The GAO report echoed program manager
beliefs that senior-level commitment to reform initiatives had not been
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translated into tangible results at the program manager level. The GAO
offered the conclusion that DoD had, once again, "... not carried through with
its action plans on most of the Carlucci Initiatives . . ." and was ". . . not
monitoring actions to ensure that results were being achieved." [Ref. ll:pp. 12-
14]
2. Grace Commission
The President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (the Grace
Commission) was the next major reform attempt of the 1980's. It was
designed to increase the efficiency of the entire government by identifying
inefficient practices and assigning estimated cost savings to its
recommendations. In December 1983, the Grace Commission reported 2,478
recommendations to eliminate waste which, if implemented, would save $12
billion over 3 years. [Ref. 12:p. 12] Defense acquisition regulatory and
reporting practices received specific mention in two Grace Commission
recommendations.
a. Issue~OSD 17 "REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS" - This
recommendation included a call for a single, comprehensive volume of
acquisition regulations. Generally, Commission recommendations under this
initiative attempted to unshackle the program manager from a centrally-
regulated and overbearing defense acquisition process. Specifically, it
recommended that instead of following the narrow and overstipulated
procedures currently in use, OSD should issue broad, policy-type statements
and allow the program managers to implement the policy or intent. The
15
Commission did acknowledge that in order for this recommendation to be
successful, highly-skilled professionals would be required to fill key positions
to interpret these statements and convert policy intent into program action.
[Ref. 13:p. 1521
b. Issue—Procurement 9 "Program Management" - The major theme of
this recommendation was the reduction of paperwork and reporting
requirements. The Commission estimated the cost of completing all required
acquisition paperwork to be two percent of the total contract price (about $700
million annually for DoD programs); others approximated this cost to be much
higher. [Ref. 7:p. 198] This recommendation also included suggestions to bring
into balance program manager authority, responsibility and accountability. A
breakdown of additional inefficiencies, similar to those provided by the Grace
Commission, is provided in Table 1.
A subsequent GAO analysis of Grace Commission recommendations
supported this issue. Results of their analysis led to the conclusion that:
Multi-layered staff and management briefings coupled with the numerous
requests and inquires direct the program manager's attention from
managing the program. Instead of the Systems Commands shielding the
PM from these non-productive activities, the various Service staffs
contribute significantly to them . . . GAO believes these issues are
longstanding and the Services have been unable to deal with them
effectively. [Ref. 14:p. 200]
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TABLE 1
GRACE COMMISSION COST SAVING AREAS
Potential annual savings
Problem area Rationale for efficiency in billions
Weapons acquisition practices:
Little use of commercial systems Individual items at least 50% cheaper (applicable
subsystems & components to at least 5% of acquisition costs) $ 15
Lack of continuous competition Net savings on applicable programs (approx 20%)
applicable to approx. 50% of production programs $ 10
Inefficient government procure- Savings estimates range from 5% to 30% of acquisi-
ment regulations and laws tion costs (low end is reasonable) $ 8
Excessive specifications Overspecification raises acquisition costs by 5% $ 8
(product & process)
Excessive prime-contractor More than required (5% of related production) $ 3
facilities and labor
Excessive data & reporting Estimated at 5% of development costs $ 3
requirements
Long development cycles Shorter cycle could reduce full-scale development
by approximately 5% $ 2
Lack of independent development Higher volume and reduced design costs should
of "standard" subsystems save 25% (on perhaps 5% of acquisition dollars) $ 2
Subtotal (root-sum-square) $ 23
Source: adapted from [Ref. 7:p. 341]
3. The Federal Acquisition Regulation
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was published in 1984 in
response to public law 93-400 and recommendations of previous defense
reform initiatives. The FAR regulates government acquisition programs as the
only applicable body of regulations. The FAR was designed to consolidate and
reconcile the existing volumes of widespread regulations which were
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duplicative, circuitous and overlapping. The author, the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy, boasted a 62% decrease in the volume of existing
regulations and elimination of nearly half of all secondary organizational and
lower-level regulations. [Ref. 14:p. 213]
It was assumed that one, comprehensive volume of regulations would
bring an end to the confusion that resulted from the baffling trail of cross-
referenced rules and regulations. In theory, this single volume of regulations
would reduce the non value-added workload and regulatory burden on the
program management office. Shockingly, 822 out of 1066 pages of the FAR
were replaced within the first two years of its existence! [Ref. l:p. 148]
The DFARS, the defense supplement to the FAR, continuously evolved
with DoD-specific regulations. It contained over 7500 pages and referred to an
additional 30,000 pages of guidance or references. [Ref. 13:p. 150]
Frequently, program management offices were not able to effectively
internalize the voluminous changes into its operating procedures. In his book,
The Defense Management Challenge, JR. Fox speculated:
The profusion of new laws, directives, and instructions, combined with the
limited training and experience of the personnel assigned to manage the
acquisition process, means in fact that practices in the field are usually
different from the laws and regulations on the books. [Ref. 8:p. 37]
Consequently, this led program managers and industry to "bump along"
until informed by one of the numerous oversight agencies of some regulatory
violation. If the violation was severe enough, additional military department
regulations were sure to follow. These "lessons-learned" regulations were
18
designed to prevent such violations from occurring again; however, they
further constricted program manger flexibility and innovation. [Ref 2:p. 22]
4. Packard Commission
Defense acquisition fraud, waste and abuse and defense-firm ethics
problems continued into the mid 1980's. Recurring stories about inefficient
defense acquisition programs prompted President Reagan to create a blue
ribbon commission in 1985. The Packard Commission (or herein just the
Commission), named after its chairman David Packard, was chartered to ". . .
evaluate the defense acquisition system, to determine how it might be
improved, and to recommend changes that could lead to the acquisition of
military equipment with equal or greater performance but at lower cost and
with less delay." [Ref. 15:p. 41]
At the completion of the study, the chairman of the Commission, David
Packard, stated:
These problems are deeply entrenched and have developed over several
decades from an increasingly bureaucratic and overregulated process. As a
result, all too many of our weapon systems cost too much, take too long to
develop, and, by the time they are fielded, incorporate obsolete technology. .
. . In general, we discovered these problems were seldom the result of fraud
or dishonesty. Rather, they were symptomatic of other underlying problems
that affect the entire acquisition system. [Ref. 15:p. 5]
Packard's final report published common-sense, business-like
recommendations including a number aimed specifically at reducing
overregulation, unnecessary reporting and providing fiscal stability to
programs. The Commission utilized a different approach to reform after
19
realizing that senior-level commitment to deregulation and avoidance of
micromanagement had not reached the program management office under
previous initiatives. [Ref. 2:p. 18]
The Commissions's far-reaching solutions emulated six characteristics of
the most successful commercial and government projects. The Commission set
forth its recommendations for acquisition improvement based on providing
these principles [Ref. 2:p. 8]:
1. Clear Command Channels
2. Program Stability
3. Limited Reporting Requirements
4. Small, High Quality Staffs
5. Communication with Users
6. Better Systems Development
The reforms forwarded by the Commission attacked the underlying,
systemic problems in the acquisition process. The Commission realized that,
in the past, new legislation and over-regulation became the normal mode of
policy implementation and stated in its report:
Federal Law governing procurement has become overwhelmingly complex.
Each new statute adopted by the Congress has spawned more administrative
regulation. As laws and regulations have proliferated, defense acquisition
has become ever more bureaucratic and encumbered by overstaffed and
unproductive layers of management. [Ref. 15:p. 48]
Legislative attempts to reform DoD acquisition systems increased during
the early 1980's. It became apparent to the Packard Commission when
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analyzing the volume of new legislation and resultant regulation (detailed in
the following section), that these tools had been used historically by the policy-
makers without any consideration of the tradeoff in managerial efficiency or
loss of individual program manager initiative.
Many managerial layers existed in the chain-of-command that existed in
the mid 1980's. Personnel in these layers had the general responsibility to
oversee managerial decisions and ensure compliance with various laws and
regulations (small and minority business requirements, reliability and
maintainability requirements, etc.). They usually required documentation for
their specific purpose or functional "rice bowl". Some even had veto power
over program manager decisions but did not share any of his responsibility or
accountability for managing the program to cost or schedule baselines. [Ref.
15:p. 46]
Their "guidance" to alter, change or veto managerial decisions usually
required additional program manager time to re-staff and re-submit whatever
was rejected. The Packard Commission recommended the elimination of these
superfluous layers to allow the manager to concentrate on managing his
program and avoid the requirement to check and defend his decision up the
lengthy chain-of-command.
The Packard reform effort, like many of its predecessors, demonstrated
that micromanagement obscured accountability and reduced incentives to
improve managerial performance. The Commission noted that by reducing
21
administrative and bureaucratic layers, a general increase in personal
accountability and reduction in administrative and bureaucratic layering would
result. [Ref. 2:p. 4] It attempted to eliminate redundant reporting requirements
by creating a new, streamlined management structure.
Under the provisions of this new structure, the program manager would
report directly to a Program Executive Officer (PEO), who would manage a
reasonable and defined number of programs. The PEO would act as the only
managerial layer between the program manager and the Service Acquisition
Executive (SAE). The SAE would be responsible for managing all military
department programs. The SAE would report directly to the Defense
Acquisition Executive (DAE) who would maintain overall responsibility for all
DoD acquisition programs. The shorter, cleaner, chain-of-command would
enable a program manager to execute his program in a manner similar to the
best managed commercial companies.
The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act demonstrated congressional support for
this respected and much needed reform and implemented many Packard
Commission recommendations including streamlined management of all DoD
acquisition programs. President Reagan issued National Security Decision
Directive 219 mandating implementation of many Packard Commission
recommendations by DoD. President Reagan indicated further resolve and
belief in the potential benefit of these reforms by requesting Mr. Packard to
return one-year later to report on the status and effectiveness of DoD implementation
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The conceptual basis for the DEP was contained in Packard Commission
recommendations that called for regulatory relief, the implementation of a
streamlined, reporting chain-of-command and fiscal stability. Congress
conceived the DEP as an experiment to consolidate and aggressively
implement these reforms in selected DoD programs. These experimental
programs would be analyzed to test the applicability and range of the Packard
initiatives in DoD acquisition programs.
C. CONGRESS
"Congress is not the answer to waste. Congress is the
problem. They mean well but reformers are too often the
cause of what's wrong with the military."
-Congressman Jim Courter
[Ref. 7:p. 109]
Regarding defense, the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clauses 11-14,
gives Congress the authority to: (1) declare war, (2) appropriate money for
defense and (3) to make rules for the government and regulation of the land
and Naval forces.
1. Acquisition Oversight
Congressional control through oversight of the acquisition process was a
major factor influencing the creation of the DEP. For many years, the typical
congressional response to major reform efforts was the attempt to force
implementation of recommendations onto DoD through extensive, detailed
legislation or report language. Although many congressmen professed to
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understand the detrimental effects of this micromanagement, little headway
was made to stem the flood of new laws and language. New policies usually
filtered down to the program management level as regulation or increased
oversight.
Figures 2-4 detail the growth of indicators of congressional
micromanagement between 1970 and 1987. The cumulative increase in each of
the categories is indicative of the degree of micromanagement felt at the
program management level. The growth of congressional micromanagement
highlighted in Figures 2-4 was used to justify DEP implementation by Senator
Dan Quayle in 1985 when he introduced the DEP concept to Congress. [Ref.
16]
Figures 2 and 3 describe the general increase in the degree of detail that
Congress pursued during this period. Disclosure of wasteful, DoD actions was
a major cause of the increase in the detail of this type of congressional
involvement. One can infer that congressional requests for program
information also increased proportionally to support this increased attention.
The categories displayed in Figure 4 had a much greater demand on
program manager time. This figure generally indicates the loss of managerial
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a. Legislative Reforms
Congress must resist its inveterate tendency to legislate
management practices and organizational details of DoD.
Excellence in defense management will not come from
legislative efforts to control and arrange the minutest
aspects of DoLTs operations. Congress can more usefully
contribute by concentrating on larger, often neglected
issues of overall defense posture and military performance.
—The Packard Commission
[Ref. 15:p. 4]
In the early 1980's, Congress introduced approximately 130 acquisition
reform laws per year. By the mid 1980's, Congress was introducing over 150
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per year! [Ref. 8:p. 37] Legislative reforms were typically the result of a quick
reaction to a particular problem. Narrowly-scoped legislative reforms, directed
at specific acquisition problems in the short term, had usually hidden, but
broad, effects over the long term. The resultant laws and regulations directed
management actions which ironically tended ". . . to exacerbate these
underlying problems by making acquisition procedures even more inflexible
and removing whatever motivation exists for the exercise of individual
judgement." [Ref. 17:p. 5] Each law passed by Congress spawned numerous
regulations within DoD. Many of these reform statutes were poorly worded
because they were the result of the process of political compromise. [Ref. 8:p.
36]
Furthermore, confusion and misinterpretation of the poorly worded
statute within DoD sometimes led to the creation of regulations that complied
with the letter of the law but not its intent. Other more important and often
immeasurable effects on program management were characterized by JR. Fox
in The Defense Management Challenge :
Ironically, in attempting to reform a management process many members
believed to be fundamentally flawed, congressmen and their staffs - though
generally well intentioned - often left new and equally serious problems in
their wake.
One undesirable effect of micro-management was the further obfuscation
of accountability . . . the vast majority of reform legislation led to so many
additional checks, balances, and layers of review that decisions remained
too often a product of the bureaucracy, not of individuals. . . Other
undesirable consequences included the reduction of managerial autonomy
and the emergence of incentives that discouraged individual initiative and
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encouraged defense managers to concentrate more on process and
procedure that on results. [Ref. 8:p. 83]
The attempt to bring into balance the authority and responsibility of
the program manager was a recurring theme of Packard Commission
recommendations. The DEP was formulated by Congress to return program
manager flexibility and authority.
b. Staff Growth
Congress experienced a 400 percent increase in the size of its staff
during the 30 years preceding 1985, while the staff level within DoD remained
relatively stable. This multitude of staff excludes additional analysts from
agencies such as GAO, CBO, and OMB. [Ref. 7:p. 110]
The proliferation of staff encouraged specialization among staff
members. Staff specialization subsequently led to more detailed requests for
data or information and encouraged micromanagerial tendencies to get worse.
More detailed management by Congress required disproportionately more data
from the program manager level. The resultant effect was a large increase in
the numbers of DoD managerial layers, distractions and time managers spent
away from their programs answering queries, completing reports and
preparing for or giving reviews and briefings. The larger congressional staffs
were able to examine the entire defense budget, line-by-line and adjust and
improve programs or procedures.
Their recommendations often ended up as law or committee report
language, both of which required a DoD response. Donald Hicks, Under
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Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering in 1986, pointed out that
approximately five pages of explanations were required to be developed by
DoD management for each of the 1800 program adjustments made by
Congress. [Ref. 18]
Figures 2 and 3 provide examples of the increased size and scope of
the Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts that coincided with the
increase in congressional staffs. While no one can assign direct cause and
effect relationships between any one of these graphs and the degree of
congressional tinkering or micromanagement, they collectively support the
hypothesis that staff size led to an increase in the degree of congressional
micromanagement. [Ref. 19]
c. Reporting
It is important to consider the burdensome effect of reporting on the
limited time program managers and their staff have to actually manage their
programs. Managers complain that they spend a majority of their time
preparing and giving reports and answering queries. Historical research of
their complaint indicated:
In 1983, 1306 witnesses testified for 2160 hours in hearings before 96
committees and subcommittees. 85,000 written budget inquires and 21,753
pages of supporting documents [were] submitted by DoD to support the
1984 budget request. The Department of Defense estimates that 'roughly
200 hours of staff time in preparation and follow-up are required for each
hour of testimony by senior DoD officials'. [Ref. 7:p. 114]
A DoD study of the 1985 National Defense Authorization and
Appropriation Acts and their associated reports identified the requirement for
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458 separate DoD reports to Congress. That year, the Pentagon dutifully
delivered an estimated 24,000 pages of documentation in execution of this
requirement. [Ref. l:p. 125]
The time program managers spend composing the above and other
reporting requirements outlined in Figure 4 seriously reduces the amount of
time spent actually managing their programs. This effect becomes more
pronounced when remembering that the increasing trend of congressional
"interest" has not slowed down. The deleterious effect on program manager
time was a key concept that supported development of the DEP concept.
Fiscal instability is another cause of a significant number of reporting
requirements. Program managers are required to prepare, defend and change
their program and budget numerous times during the life of the program. On
the average, a ". . . R&D program is voted by Congress alone an average of 18
times a year in its 8-year life—a total of 144 opportunities to change
something." [Ref. l:p. 1711 This made it essential for program managers to
politic the numerous congressional committees and subcommittees as well as
their superiors within the military organization to ensure satisfactory program
funding was continued to their programs.
Continued uncertainty of future program budget levels changes the
program manager role from manager to advocate. This role may have
decreased his incentive to aggressively report cost and schedule inefficiencies
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in his program because it showed weakness and exposed the program to
potential budget reductions. [Ref. 7:p. 211]
Declining defense budgets caused congressional and DoD budget
decision makers to cut programs annually. Budget comptrollers quickly
reprogrammed the budgets of those programs that showed particular
weakness in cost or schedule baselines. The additional time managers were
impelled to spend acting as the program advocate meant less time for them to
actively manage their program. Program managers report spending 50-70
percent of their time advocating their program to higher levels. [Ref. 7:p. 212]
To increase the efficiency of the acquisition process and reduce the
"hidden cost" of program advocacy, the Packard Commission recommended
stabilizing programs by utilizing multi-year budgets. One pillar of the DEP
called for the experimental implementation of milestone-to-milestone
authorization to increase program efficiency while also reducing the reporting
and advocacy burden on program managers.
Unfortunately, the political reality of the budget process prevented
this aspect of reform from complete implementation. The delicate balance of
power within the congressional committees and between the Executive Branch
and Congress would be significantly upset by the widespread use of multi-
year budgets in DoD. Further analysis is presented in Chapter V. Currently,
the defense budget is generally authorized bi-annually but defended, debated
and appropriated every year.
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d. Other Bodies Tlwt Influence Acquisition Policy
Organizations other than Congress also affect acquisition policy.
Although many lacked binding, statutory authority to impose their controls,
DoD could not blatantly disregard their "direction" or "guidance". For
example, DoD must comply with OMB circulars although they are not based
in statute. Because it is confusing what authority these requirements have,
status as neither law, report language nor DoD regulation contributes to
making the program manager's job of compliance even more difficult. [Ref. 20]
A plethora of audit agencies employed by Congress, the Executive
Branch and within DoD also affect acquisition policy. A substantial amount of
program management time is required to participate in an audit. [Ref. 21, 22]
Auditors have a pervasive effect on the attitude of the acquisition community
(this is discussed in a later section). Results of an audit could potentially,
return in one of the more formal controls such as law or regulation.
e. Summary
The actual and opportunity costs of the extra time and effort required
to comply with new and existing laws, regulations, audits and reporting
requirements are seldom weighed against their cost by policy-makers when
designing a new control. The opportunity cost of the time managers do not
spend checking and managing their program could be enormous and should
be considered. Furthermore, the controls and the addition costs are rarely
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removed from the regulatory structure after the original purpose or objective
disappears.
The resultant morass of laws, regulations and reporting requirements
began to resemble a compost pile. The old requirements lay at the bottom of
the pile while new ones were heaped on top. Soon, those new requirements
are covered by even newer ones. Defense Enterprise Programs attempted to
sweep away the antiquated regulatory and reporting requirements that were
no longer relevant to DoD acquisition programs.
D. DEPARTMENT of DEFENSE - ACQUISITION
"The way we're doing business now, if you come down
from on high and you said your job was to devise the
worst combination between Congress, the Pentagon and all
the elements, I think we've got it."
- Senator Sam Nunn
[Ref. 23]
1. General Climate
The public was bombarded by press reports indicating alleged waste,
fraud and abuse of almost criminal proportion in the early and mid-1 980's.
The flood of acquisition reform which followed was reportedly instituted in
patchwork fashion. [Ref. 23] Disclosure of outrageous spare parts prices,
enormous overruns on acquisition programs and numerous investigations of
ethics violations had the public clamoring for justice.
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a. Public Perception
A March 1985 Harris
/
Business Week poll reported that
approximately 70% of the American public was convinced that contractors
routinely overcharged the government. One year later, the Packard
Commission revealed the public belief that almost half the DoD budget was
lost to waste and fraud. [Ref. 8:pp. 35-36] Continual fraud headlines
"sustained reformist pressures in Congress and nullified pleas from Pentagon
and defense industry officials for a one or two year pause in statutory action."
[Ref. 23:p. 31
Within DoD, a "reform-of-the-month" attitude seemed to prevail. In
congressional testimony, General L. Skantze, Commander Air Force Systems
Command, tried to convince Congress to refrain from implementing further
reforms describing the climate this way:
With the flood of complex legislation we have been implementing. . . .
we seem to be in a constant state of turmoil interpreting new requirements,
writing regulations, training our people and verifying implementations. We
have not had time to examine the results of the new requirements, refine
our policies and then develop recommended changes we believe are
appropriate. [Ref. 24:p. 371
Acquisition experts within DoD realized that their number one goal
was to, ". . . lock on to the public confidence". [Ref. 251 It was postulated that
more efficient acquisition might help show the public and Congress that DoD




Many in the acquisition community were quick to acknowledge that
the acquisition system was a mess and that no one in particular could be
blamed. Mistrust of the acquisition community was rampant.
Congresswoman Barbara Boxer, an active participant in the acquisition reform
debates of 1985, justified the reason for this mistrust. She believed that
Congress ". . . learned to be suspicious of [DoD] assurances that things are not
as bad as they seem and are getting better all the time. The evidence of
Pentagon waste and mismanagement is never ending." [Ref. 24:p. 33]
Numerous audits were employed as a result of this mistrust. [Ref. 7:p.
112] Congress and DoD employed an army of auditors (GAO, DoD Inspector
General and military department audit agencies) to ensure programs complied
with the multitude of laws, regulations and reporting requirements. An
informal survey of top contractors found that on the average, 800-1000
government personnel "visited" each company, each week . [Ref. 26]
Auditors were sometimes perceived by those in the acquisition
community as "hired-guns", sent in to find something wrong with a program.
[Refs. 22, 27] The professional reputation and promotion of the program
manager is based on his managerial performance. Therefore, it seems logical
to conclude that the program manager had incentive to assume the advocate
role whenever necessary and cease reporting trouble to try to make his
program look good. The juxtaposition of this and the responsible manager
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role presents the manager with a no-win situation. He might fail if he actively
seeks and reports program inefficiencies or conversely, strongly advocates his
program while inefficiencies are discovered by others.
Demands for managerial enhancement programs like the DEP
resounded in the halls of Congress and the Pentagon. It was widely
understood that "... with a cooperative effort rather than an adversarial, [one
could] take specific programs, make some radical, quantum changes in how
we do business, and [givel some big payoffs for this country." [Ref. 20]
A small number of these radical programs had been operating for
many years and apparently suffered much less from the debilitating effects of
excessive oversight and micromanagement. "Black" (classified) programs
operated under a security blanket that restricted data access and eliminated
much of the routine oversight experienced by regular programs. Many
acquisition experts, including Senator Sam Nunn, believed that "black"
programs, with their lack of detailed oversight, ". . . in many cases, are
managed better than the white." [Ref. 23] He acknowledged that
overregulation ". . . has produced such a staggering bureaucratic nightmare
that there is an increasing tendency to go black" in order to get around it.
[Ref. 23]
Air Force "black" or specialized-management programs, operating
under Air Force Regulation (AFR) 800-29, were considered to be relatively
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successful programs. [Ref. 16] The specialized-management process was
designed to
. . . cut through red tape and enable selected people to bypass routine
management requirements, some staff, and get on with the task at hand;
however, public law remains sacrosanct . . . Specialized management allows
program managers wide latitude to ignore paperwork and tasks including
justification of their respective individual decisions. [Ref. 12:p. 15]
Specialized management programs were the precursors of the DEP.
One interviewee on the SASC staff believed that the DEP was created with
characteristics similar to "black" programs in an attempt to reduce oversight
and increase managerial authority and responsibility in non-classified
programs. [Ref. 16]
c. Risk Aversion
The program manager is at the center of competition within and
between the DoD, Congress, and the defense industry. He must respond to
each according to their varied needs and agendas. The result of systemic
congressional and DoD micromanagement has been program management
with "... a negative, mind-numbing, debilitating mindset that takes refuge in
checklists, a work-to-the-rule ethic, and an adamant refusal to say yes to any
innovation proposal or deviation from established procedures." [Ref. 6:p. 79]
News headlines of program waste or abuse were constantly available to
remind managers of the consequences of failure. This offered a terrific
incentive to managers to act by "checking-the-box" marked regulation instead
of applying good, business-sense to management decisions. [Ref. 2:p. 4]
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Program managers had and still have strong legal incentive to avoid
all appearances of collusion with industry because of numerous ongoing ethics
investigations. One method that program managers used to avoid collusion
was by managing to the absolute letter of the laws and regulations even if this
prevented making common sense concessions to the contractor. One industry
vice-president commented that ". . . the barrage of propaganda, the fraud
hotlines, the guilty before explanation atmosphere have a paralytic effect. In
short, there are mostly downside outcomes for the collaborative government
[employee]." [Ref. 20:p. 109]
The other aspect of risk aversion involves reporting requirements. As
burdensome as reporting had become, it offered one significant advantage for
the program manager—shelter from complete responsibility for the outcome of
his program. Responsibility for program outcome was diffused via reporting
to include all who received the reports. If circumstances led to trouble in a
program, a manager could identify superiors who had reviewed his plan and
offered no comment, implying tacit approval. It was felt that superiors, once
notified of program status or managerial intent, shared program risk through
implied consensus with the report unless they wrote a rebuttal. [Ref. 16:p. 35]
2. Staff Effects
As Congress increased the detail of the information it requested, DoD
added layers of management to collect the data. The continual evolution of
the acquisition structure "buried the program manager under layers of people
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above him." [Ref. 28] "Staffers" oversaw every program manager decision to
ensure compliance with the increasing multitude of laws and rules affecting
his program. Program managers maintained that ". . . at each level of this
chain, a bureaucracy has been created to fulfill and perpetuate these
requirements." [Ref. 12:p. 13]
The Packard Commission also recognized the burdensome effects on
program managers of the superfluous staff and management layers throughout
DoD. It recommended elimination of these layers to allow the manager to
concentrate on managing his program instead of checking and defending his
decision up the lengthy chain-of-command. [Ref. 17:p. 16]
Some "staffers" within each management layer had veto power over
program manager actions yet did not share responsibility for managing the
program to cost or schedule baseline. Their choice to change or veto a
decision usually required additional managerial time to draft a response or
additional money for a study which was not built into the original program
baseline. [Ref. 7:p. 147]
The Commission further recommended creation of a new Under
Secretary of Defense position (USD/A) as the new centerpiece of its new
defense acquisition hierarchy at the OSD level. Service Acquisition Executives
(SAE) were to be designated at the military department level and manage all
military department programs. The Program Executive Officer (PEO) would
oversee a specific number of programs and act as the only managerial layer
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between the program manager and the SAE. Of note, the systems commands
of each military department were excluded from the line-type, managerial
chain-of-command. [Ref. 15:p. 50]
This reorganization was supported by a broader reform movement
within Congress aimed at stopping further diffusion of program manager
authority and accountability. The congressional desire to return program
manager authority to appropriate levels was an underlying philosophy of
Packard Commission reforms and the DEP. Congressman Bill Nichols, co-
author of the implementation legislation for Packard Commission reforms, the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, summed up the undercurrent of the Packard
Commission reform effort this way:
We are looking for personal accountability and elimination of
unnecessary layers of bureaucracy, not to have a person to point a finger at
when things go wrong; rather, to give authority back to the person
responsible for making a decision, and to stop second guessing.
This concern was the genesis for the Program Executive Officer (PEO)
concept. Although this concept was conceived by the Packard Commission,
the Congress was receptive to the idea because it fit hand-in-glove with
another concern of ours—that there is no accountability in the Department of
Defense acquisition process. Program managers were changing frequently,
and so many people were involved in making programmatic decisions that
it was impossible to say any one person was in charge of a program . . . We
hoped this might force a reevaluation of the necessity for reviewing
organizations. [Ref. 29]
While not a specifically enumerated reform of the Packard Commission, the
DEP embodied many of its concepts. The three pillars of the DEP were:
1. reducing unnecessary regulatory and reporting
requirements
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2. utilizing a streamlined management structure to
reduce excessive oversight
3. utilizing milestone-to-milestone funding to improve
fiscal stability and improve managerial and fiscal
efficiency.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
A review of the reforms of the past decade offers insight into the perceived
problems in the DoD acquisition process. Each reform addressed issues of
bureaucratic growth, regulation and managerial inflexibility and attempted to
apply sound, commercial business practices to DoD acquisition management.
However, implementation of each reform failed to provide acquisition
managers with the intended improvements in efficiency.
The Packard Commission endeavored to be different by attempting to
correct the underlying systemic problems that plagued the DoD acquisition
process. It suggested a significant restructuring of the acquisition chain-of-
command and recommended the return of program manager authority and
responsibility to satisfactory and proportionate levels.
Congressional opinion on the method to achieve improvements in the
acquisition system diverged. Some members of Congress desired to
experiment with the DEP concept by granting managerial flexibility. These
members realized the extent of the wide-spread growth of micromanagement
and its deleterious effects. Still, other members countered this agenda with
almost daily observations that the system needed close oversight.
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Ultimately, what many members of Congress failed to realize in the 1980's
was that each narrowly-scoped legislative reform spawned numerous and
sometimes misdirected regulations with long-term effects within DoD. These
regulations had broad effects that stifled managerial initiative and the incentive
to apply good business sense to everyday decisions.
The effect of micromanagement on the program manager was perverse.
Almost daily stories of $600 toilet seats and $400 hammers generated
congressional and public mistrust of the acquisition system. The use of
frequent program audits gave program managers cause to execute programs in
compliance with every letter of every law while, at times, disregarding good
business-sense decisions. The next chapter analyzes the characteristics of the
Defense Enterprise Program in greater detail.
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III. DEFENSE ENTERPRISE PROGRAM - GENESIS
The provisions in regard to contract, I fear, will do
little good. The legislation on this subject is already
complicated and the additional guards intended by this bill
will still more embarrass officers and people in the
transaction of the public business.
Every additional obstacle adds to the delay and to
the cost of procuring military supplies.
The department needs tools to work with.
Regulations, laws, customs, prescriptions as to its manner
of doing business already exist in abundance.
— M. C. Megis
Quartermaster General of the Army,
1864
A. CONGRESSIONAL GOALS AND INTENT
Congressional advocates of acquisition reform in 1986 generally assumed
that the inefficient managerial practices of DoD had become entrenched over
time and would not be changed quickly. However, they also assumed that the
probability of declining defense budgets in the future would necessitate a
departure from the old and less efficient DoD acquisition methods: a view
shared with DoD. [Ref. 3:p. 257] The DEP was an attempt by Congress to
implement Packard Commission recommendations to establish acquisition
procedures similar to those employed in successful commercial entities.
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1. Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on
Acquisition Policy
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees established
subcommittees on acquisition policy in 1985 to assess how well DoD had "...
executed recent procurement statutes and whether Congress [couldl find a
broad approach to reform in lieu of piecemeal adjustments" that had been
made in the past. [Ref. 24: p. 35] Senator Dan Quayle, chairman of the Senate
subcommittee and his staff, conducted numerous interviews with program
managers early in the research phase of this reform effort to gain an
understanding of what they believed was wrong with the acquisition process.
He later revealed the general intent of his subcommittee, reporting that he:
. . . talked to one program manager in charge of a major procurement
program who said he has 41 bosses between himself and the Secretary of
the Air Force. You tell me how that person can manage his program. He
can't. You've got to give them the authority to run their own programs and
then hold them accountable. I'd sure like to eliminate all 41 of those
checkers, although legislatively you can't. . . we're [going to] try to shift the
trend away from more checkers to less. [Ref. 24: p. 35]
Common responses given by program managers during the interviews
indicated that too many regulatory and reporting requirements existed and
that program managers did not have enough authority or flexibility to
effectively manage their programs. [Ref. 16] Senator Quayle supplied Packard
Commission analysts with a detailed synopsis of these interviews. These
results later became the basis for some of the Packard Commission
recommendations. [Ref. 16]
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The acquisition policy subcommittees held hearings throughout 1985 and
1986 and solicited testimony from numerous witnesses expert in the defense
acquisition process. Their testimony spanned the broad spectrum of
acquisition and brought great insight on process inefficiencies. When asked to
offer solutions to these problems, the witnesses usually echoed the calls of the
program manager interviews for relief from overregulation, increased fiscal
stability and a moratorium on any further legislation. [Ref. 16]
Senator Quayle decided to focus the Senate subcommittee
recommendations on giving program managers more managerial latitude to
run their programs. [Ref. 16] The subcommittee recommended eliminating
some of the managerial layering, reducing program manager reporting and
adopting a management-by-exception approach similar to that used by DoD.
[Ref. 24:pp. 35-37] The management-by-exception approach calls for a "hands-
off" management style that attempts to minimize interruptions or intrusions on
management. A program operating under this concept is reviewed and
evaluated only at certain intervals, usually milestones, and left to run without
interruption as long as it continues to operate within the established baseline
flexibility limits. "Trigger" events (ie., exceeding a baseline) are also usually
established to signal trouble and require program review between regular
reviews to accommodate eventualities. [Ref. 38:p. 12] Senator Quayle
ultimately recommended the return of program manager authority to match
his responsibility through DEP legislation. [Ref. 24:p. 35] As a result of these
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interviews and subcommittee testimony, Senator Quayle conceived, introduced
and spearheaded passage of DEP legislation in 1986. [Ref. 16]
2. Defense Enterprise Program Goals and Congressional Intent
Testimony to both defense acquisition policy subcommittees revealed the
general belief that a management approach more like that found in commercial
industry could be applied to DoD acquisition with profound results. Many
commented that commercial style management, based on the principles of ". . .
decentralization, clear lines of authority and responsibility, and streamlined
procedures have proven consistently successful in the past." [Ref. 3:p. 256]
Furthermore, within Congress there existed underlying concerns
regarding the broad diffusion of authority and responsibility within DoD.
Senator Nancy Kassebaum frustratingly reported to the Packard Commission
that "if everyone is responsible for everything, then no one is really responsible
for anything specific ... I think it also really engages Congress very much in a
micromanagement type of activity, which I do not really think works to great
benefit either." [Ref. 24:p. 35]
Interviews with professional staff members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) indicated that, quite differently from its counterpart in the
House, the SASC had a general feeling of trust and belief in the ability of
program manager to appropriately manage programs. [Ref. 16] This trust
created an environment sympathetic to initiation of reforms that called for
increased managerial freedom and less oversight for DoD programs.
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Senator Sam Nunn, now the influential chairman of the SASC, demonstrated
his support for this concept in 1985 by proposing that Congress give a few
pilot programs "one-paragraph treatment" in law, waiving almost all existing
rules and regulations. He offered this summary of the envisioned paragraph;
"We want this to be done with an effective and efficient procurement method
with the maximum of competition to the extent feasible and practical, period,
end of sentence - 'now go do it.'" [Ref. 23] The environment of trust and the
results of program manager interviews are both key components and
foundation of the Defense Enterprise Program.
Congress implemented the DEP in a broader attempt to link program
manager authority and responsibility. It intended that under DEP
management, "the authority of the program manager to manage his program
with minimum reliance on outside review would be enhanced" and that he
would "... have the authority to accept or reject the proposals of the normal
functional and oversight organizations within the Service with respect to his
program." [Ref. 3:pp. 257-8] It was implied that while Congress would grant
increased authority, it would also hold the program managers more
accountable for the results of their managerial initiative.
Some members of Congress showed a keen interest in seeing this
initiative succeed. The SASC report accompanying the legislation made
specific recommendations regarding program selection. It outlined the
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minimum qualifications a program manager needed and empowered him to
select a personal staff without regard to normal military department protocols.
These characteristics, as well as the overall concept of the DEP, vaguely
resemble the qualities of "black" programs. Staff of the SASC reported that in
fact, some qualities of "black" programs (limited regulatory and reporting
requirements and selective staffs) were directly detailed into DEP legislation.
[Ref. 16]
Realizing that the DoD transition from the current system to that
envisioned for the DEP might not be easy, Congress urged particular care and
caution in the selection of the programs chosen for designation. Initially
limited to major acquisition programs by law, the SASC report on the 1987
National Defense Authorization Act, "... concluded that such limitation was
not necessary, and that in fact the Secretaries should select non-major
programs as well as major systems for the purpose of determining the extent
of the concept's applicability." [Ref. 3:p. 257]
The committee forwarded the following program selection criteria that it
believed would be critical to the success of DEPs. [Ref. 3:p. 257]:
1. the projects should incorporate relatively mature technology with
moderate program risk;
2. the projects should be firmly supported by requirements analysis and
represent a consensus solution to meeting those requirements;
3. the projects should not initially be multi-billion dollar programs, but
more modest programs;
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4. the programs should promise significant advances over current
capabilities
They also added policy guidance that required DEPs to have the most
capable program managers available. They required him to have at least eight
years of acquisition experience and assured greater stability of management
v
than the norm by requiring him to serve at least four years or through the next
major milestone.
The committee authorized him to immediately hand-pick the finest staff
from other organizations. This power allowed him to choose and appoint his
own senior and technical staff without regard for the standard protocol of
designation by the Bureau of Personnel. The ability to select personal staffs
was designed to allow the program manager to control the quality of his
support staff and help him more efficiently manage his program. He was
given direct control of these staffs to guarantee their absolute accountability.
These staffs were intended for use in an advisory role and to facilitate
more effective liaison with other organizations. They were not however,
intended to "substitute for or duplicate the roles and functions of existing
organizations within the service or DoD." [Ref. 3:p. 258]
Congress intended DoD to apply the improved management practices
envisioned for the DEP on a discerning basis to selected pilot programs with
the hope of applying lessons-learned to programs DoD-wide. In its report on
the 1987 National Defense Authorization Act, the SASC expressed the hope
that the ". . . managerial lessons derived from enterprise programs be applied
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to the management of all defense programs to the maximum extent
practicable." [Ref. 3:p. 257]
B. LEGISLATION
1. Original Senate Bill
Senator Quayle introduced Senate Bill S.2082 titled "Defense Acquisition
Enterprise and Initiative Act" in Feb 1986. Relevant sections are provided in
Appendix B. Interviews with professional members of the SASC staff
indicated that this was not the original form of the bill. [Ref. 16]
They recalled that the original DEP concept was based on managerial
trust and a sincere attempt to grant greater managerial flexibility and authority
to program managers. They recalled the inclusion of provisions for regulatory
relief and use of the recently-developed, streamlined-reporting, chain-of-
command. The milestone-authorization concept was later included in the bill
as a result of compromise as the bill passed the legislative process. [Ref. 16]
2. Enabling Legislation
Authorization to proceed with Defense Enterprise Program execution
was embedded in the 1987 National Defense Authorization Act and later
incorporated into the U.S. Code as Title 10, section 2436 and 2437. Sections
relevant to the DEP are provided in Appendix C.
During SASC hearings on the DEP legislation, some congressmen were
quick to point out that DoD already possessed the power necessary to
implement a program similar to that called for in the bill. DoD could already
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reduce military department regulations and reporting requirements and
enhance the role of the program manager at the current time without further
legislative impetus from Congress. During testimony, Mr. David Packard
understood and anticipated DoD organizational resistance to change and
simply answered this challenge believing that because this contention was true,
"Congress was going to have to continue to put some pressure [on DoD] on
this." [Ref. 30:p. 45]
3. Comparison
A comparison of the original Senate bill (Appendix B) and final
legislation (Appendix C) shows a major difference in emphasis and structure,
specifically regarding the relative importance of milestone-authorization. This
reformation demonstrates a marked shift and diversion in the overall intent
and attitude of Congress regarding the DEP.
The original bill primarily focused on increasing managerial authority
and responsibility via regulatory and reporting relief. It also contained two
paragraphs describing the intent of Congress to provide milestone-
authorization when requested. In the final legislative action, the milestone-
authorization process is elevated and described in great detail, receiving
emphasis in an entirely distinct section of the law. This change in emphasis
was the result of compromise with the HASC to get the bill into law. [Ref. 16]
What initially started out as an experimental reform extending
managerial trust by supplying regulatory and reporting relief, became a
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complex undertaking possibly requiring the submission of program cost and
schedule baselines to Congress. It also established required, elaborate
procedures for SECDEF notification of Congress in the event a DEP, approved
for milestone-authorization, deviated from its baseline. Automatic,
instantaneous cancellation of further obligational authority for the milestone-
approved funds of a DEP was one possible outcome of the baseline breach
procedure that did not exist for non, milestone-approved, DEPs. This
unfortunate redirection of congressional intent resulted in greater risk for DEPs
and became a major issue in implementation.
4. Pillars of the Defense Enterprise Program
The implementing legislation outlined the three major principles of the




Each of these pillars indicated the overall congressional intent to return
program manager authority while increasing his responsibility.
a. Regulatory Relief
A major component of the DEP was regulatory relief. Congress
repeatedly received appeals for regulatory relief from experts in the acquisition
field. Members of Congress incorporated this pillar because they
acknowledged that the number of detailed directives and regulations had
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increased with the growth of the bureaucratic structure. Some believed that
the acquisition process had become too inflexible. [Ref. 3:p. 256]
Congress created the law to simply state, ". . .a DEP shall not be
subject to any regulation, policy, directive, or administrative rule or guideline
relating to the acquisition activities of DoD other than the Federal Acquisition
Regulation and the DoD supplement to the FAR . . . ." [Ref. 31 :p. 3915]
Congress clearly intended to permit DEP managers to disregard all
DoD-regulatory guidelines. However, nothing was done to reduce the
regulatory burden of regulations that were based in statute, the FAR or
DFARS.
The Senate report on the 1987 National Defense Authorization Act
also included the requirement that the SAE ". . . review each additional
directive, policy and other guideline for an enterprise program on an
individual basis before any further administrative requirements are added to
the program." [Ref. 3:p. 258] This requirement was designed to ensure that
DEP managers remained unencumbered by reducing the ability of other
organizations to impose parochially-inspired requirements on them. This also
conspicuously placed responsibility on the SAE for keeping the degree of
regulation in balance.
b. Streamlined Management
The SASC acknowledged in its report on the 1987 National Defense
Authorization Act that:
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The current framework for acquisition management in the Department of
Defense runs counter to the private industry model. The authority and
responsibility for the management of specific programs have been diluted
by the growth of large bureaucratic oversight and review organizations.
The growth of this bureaucracy has resulted in the insertion of unnecessary
layers between program managers and the Secretaries of the Services. [Ref.
3:p. 256]
The DEP reporting process was constructed to utilize the streamlined
reporting chain-of-command envisioned by the Packard Commission (not line-
of-communication). It was the intent of Congress that, comparable to
commercial practices, "... only the minimum reporting requirements
consistent with statute and executive orders would encumber the enterprise
program manager." [Ref. 3:p. 258] Institutionalization of the streamlined
management structure would also enable Congress to affix responsibility for
program results more easily.
According to the law, the program manager would be responsible to
report only to the PEO, "directly, without intervening review or approval."
[Ref. 31 :p. 3914] Subsequently, the PEO would report under the same
conditions to the SAE. Finally, responsibility would flow to the DAE
(USD/A), who would act as the czar of the acquisition hierarchy and maintain
responsibility for all DoD programs.
The law eliminated reporting through superfluous managerial layers
which also diffused responsibility. It kept these layers from interfering
managerially by requiring their parochial "chop" on decisions thereby
forcefully asserting their views and opinions on DEP manager plans.
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Another facet of streamlined management that Congress included in
the program legislation dealt with DEP manager performance evaluations.
DEP procedures directed program manager performance evaluations be issued
by the PEO and based on the manager's ability to achieve the objectives of his
program, such as quality, timeliness and cost. This requirement intended to
free the manager from his concerns regarding actions to eliminate, and perhaps
perturb, superiors in the existing chain-of-command.
c. Milestone-to-Milestone Funding
The last major pillar of the DEP endeavored to provide fiscal stability
for programs by sanctioning milestone-to-milestone funding (authorization
only). This experiment in milestone-authorization was a preliminary attempt
to provide programs with forward funding (authorization and appropriation)
stability.
Long recognized to be a major contributor to managerial inefficiency,
the grueling and time consuming process of annual program budget reviews
for the multitude of military department and congressional organizations ". . .
reinforces a tendency to focus on accounting considerations rather than policy
issues. It tends also to prolong contentiousness over a program, thus
undermining stable program management." [Ref. 3:p. 259]
In outlining the milestone-authorization pillar, DEP legislation ". . .
established a new framework for legislative oversight and authorization of
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defense acquisition programs" that the SASC regarded to be superior to the
current overbearing system in use. [Ref. 3:p. 259]
This new funding concept mirrored the Packard Commission
recommendation to extend to Congress, the DoD driven procedure of
baselining and reviewing program performance only at major milestones
(management-by-exception). Congressional milestone review and
authorization would free the program manager from further SASC and HASC
attention unless the milestone-authorized DEP deviated from its established
baseline. The fiscal stability achieved by an ideal milestone-funding process,
authorization and forward funded appropriation, would finally allow program
managers to plan for the long-term with some degree of assurance.
The DEP law allowed SECDEF to chose any or all of the DEPs to be
designated milestone-to-milestone authorization candidates as long as it was
ready to proceed or currently in full-scale engineering development or full-rate
production. For those programs chosen for milestone-authorization, the law
required SECDEF to submit a milestone-authorization request along with the
program baseline to Congress 90 days after a program was designated a
milestone-funding candidate.
The DEP law also provided a complex and troublesome procedure in
the event a DEP, approved for milestone-authorization, deviated from its
baseline. Automatic cancellation of all future obligational authority would
occur 60 days after the SECDEF was notified of a deviation unless he reported
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to Congress his intent to convene a board to formally review the program. He
was also required to render the findings and recommendations of the review
board along with a revised program baseline to Congress with the next fiscal
year budget submission for analysis.
On top of all this, once a program deviation report was submitted by
the milestone-approved DEP, the congressionally-approved, milestone-to-
milestone funding for that program was automatically canceled at the
beginning of the next fiscal year. This cancellation required the whole
burdensome, milestone-funding procedure to begin again. This additional
burden became a significant issue with DEP managers that saw added
program risk of fiscal instability with little potential program benefit.
One of their intended benefits of milestone-authorization was to
decrease the time managers spend briefing and justifying their programs. The
time saved by the absence of an annual budget review cycle for authorizations
might allow managers to spend more time managing a program. Program
managers constantly complained that they had too little time to manage their
program because of what they viewed to be excessive reporting requirements.
[Ref. 8:p. 128]
Economic reasoning supports the notion that if far enough away from
managerial equilibrium point, a marginal increase in a scarce resource like the
time spent managing a program could yield a much larger gain in program
efficiency. However, the potential increase in program efficiency has not been
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parametrically quantified, although intuition suggests that it might be
significant. The potential increase in managerial efficiency gained from any
elimination of annual fiscal justification must be compared with the potentially
catastrophic results of a program fiscal error due to reduced oversight.
Congress did not intend to grant milestone-authorization liberally.
[Ref. 3:p. 2591 The Senate Armed Services Committee announced that
milestone authorization would be given only after thorough review of the
program and its alternatives. On the other hand, the SASC reported that if
any milestone-authorization request was approved, "it will be equally diligent
in minimizing further congressional interference as long as the program
conforms to the program management baseline submitted with the request."
[Ref. 3:p. 259]
C. DEPARTMENT of DEFENSE RESPONSE
A brief description of the initial DoD response permits analysis of the key
factors that led to the demise of the DEP. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition (USD/A), Richard Godwin responded to DEP legislation on 5 Jan
1987 in a memorandum to the SAEs (Appendix D). He requested each to
recommend at least three programs to be considered as DEP candidates,
although the law plainly stated ". . . the Secretary of a military department
may designate any defense acquisition program . . . ." [Ref. 31 :p. 3914] This
USD/A memorandum quietly usurped the designation authority of the SAE.
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No OSD-level guidance regarding which type of program to recommend
other than the legislation was provided to assist the military departments in
making their choices. USD/A required delivery of the response from the
military departments to the Joint Requirements Management Board (now the
Defense Acquisition Board) for approval within 10 days of receipt of the
memorandum. [Ref. 32]
Additionally in this memorandum, USD/A Godwin directed each military
department to nominate candidates for milestone-authorization from the DEP
candidate list. He requested that the recommended milestone-authorization
candidates have the following characteristics and advised the SAEs that
recommendations which did not meet these criteria would not be accepted.
[Ref. 32] He desired the candidates to:
1
.
be of the highest priority to the military department, OSD and Congress
2. have the full commitment of all three parties and
3. be relatively stable programs, facing, at most, limited technical risk
The services responded to USD/A Godwin's request by forwarding the
following list of DEP candidates:
ARMY NAVY
1. Mobile Subscriber 5. Trident D-5
Equipment (MSE) Missile
2. ATACMS Missile 6. SSN-21
AIR FORCE
9. SRAM II Missile
10. C-17 Aircraft
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3. TOW II Missile
4. AAWS-M
7. T-45 Training 11. Medium Launch
System T45TS Vehicle (MLV)
8. V-22 Aircraft 12. Titan IV Booster
Rocket
13. ATF
On 30 Mar 1987, nearly five months after the DEP law was enacted,
DEPSECDEF Taft sent letters to the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees (Appendix E) that designated the following ten Defense Enterprise
Programs:
ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE
1. Mobile Subscriber 4. Trident D-5
Equipment (MSE) Missile
2. ATACMS Missile 5. SSN-21
7. SRAM H Missile
8. C-17 Aircraft
3. TOW II Missile 6. T-45 Training 9. Medium Launch
System (T-45TS) Vehicle (MLV)
10. Titan IV Booster
Rocket
The memorandum also recommended Trident D-5, MSE and MLV as
milestone-authorization candidates. Congress subsequently approved the
Trident D-5 and MSE for milestone-authorization and provided the promised
authorization stability in the 1988/89 National Defense Authorization Act. [Ref.
31 :p. 8] Congress also included two programs not recommended by DoD.
The ATACMS and T-45TS programs were also granted milestone-authorization
in the 1988 National Defense Authorization Act.
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It is noteworthy that every program approved by Congress for milestone-
authorization subsequently exceeded its cost or schedule baseline within two-
years. The ATACMS program breached its cost and schedule baseline in
February 1989 and January 1990 because the of test delays. The Army's MSE
program breached its cost baseline in January 1989 because of a reduction in
the quantity to be procured which caused the unit cost to go up. The Navy T-
45TS aircraft breached its cost and schedule baseline in March 1989 because of
test deficiencies and delivery delays. The Trident D-5 broke its schedule
baseline because of technical deficiencies. [Ref. 33:p. 4]
These deviations led Congress to rescind milestone-authorization for all
programs in the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act. No other DEPs
were submitted or approved for milestone-authorization after the initial
request in 1987. [Ref. 5:pp. 264-5]
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Chapter III provides a description of the genesis of the DEP and a brief
analysis of the DoD response. The initial DEP concept was based on program
manager interviews conducted by Senator Dan Quayle and his staff and
congressional testimony to the SASC subcommittee on acquisition policy.
Senator Quayle introduced the DEP bill in response to program manager and
acquisition community pleas for a reduction in excessive oversight as well as
feelings in Congress that responsibility within DoD acquisition was too diffuse.
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Congress intended to use DEPs as an experiment in applying management
practices, proven in the commercial world, on DoD acquisition programs to try
to reduce micromanagement and improve the link between program manager
authority and responsibility. Unfortunately, the DEP concept degenerated
from a simple experiment in managerial trust into an initiative that added
administrative burden and potentially, some degree of financial risk of losing
all obligational authority for those programs additionally designated as
milestone-authorized programs. [Ref. 3:p. 257]
The DEP legislation included three major pillars to accomplish the intent of
Congress. They were regulatory relief, streamlined management and
milestone-to-milestone funding. The DEP was intended to provide regulatory
relief by waiving all regulations, policies, directives and guidelines not based
on the FAR, DFARS or statute.
Congress detailed line authority through a streamlined management
structure in an attempt to eliminate oversight of superfluous layers of
management. Managers could now avoid (theoretically) the imposition of
oversight requirements by staff personnel with no responsibility for managing
the program to cost or schedule baselines. It would and also allow Congress
to affix responsibility for program results more easily on the program
manager.
Milestone-authorization was intended to improve program fiscal and
managerial efficiency by eliminating annual budget justification and by
63
allowing the program manager to make future plans with some degree of
certainty that they would be carried out. Milestone-authorization was an
optional feature of the DEP that did, however, result in additional
administrative burden and increased program risk because of the potential for
immediate loss of obligational authority. Deviation would also automatically
suspend milestone authority at the beginning of the next fiscal year. In the
worst case scenario, immediate, automatic suspension of all fiscal obligational
authority of the program could result.
During initial implementation, USD/A usurped the statutory authority of
the SAEs to designate DEPs at the military department level. Nearly five
months after Congress authorized the DEP, DoD designated 10 programs and
forwarded three of these to Congress for milestone-authorization. Congress
granted milestone-authorization to two DoD recommendations and added two
of their own choosing. All four programs subsequently exceeded their
baselines within two years.
Many of the impediments to effective DEP implementation are identifiable.
Analysis of these hindrances is essential so that future management teams may
understand and avoid them while trying to implement reforms similar to the
DEP. Chapter IV analyzes the execution of the DEP initiative and identifies
pitfalls for future reforms.
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IV. DEFENSE ENTERPRISE PROGRAM - RESULTS
Weapons programs must now run a gauntlet of
paperwork, which adds far more to cost than is saved by
the safeguards. If this trend continues, we could expect
that by the year 2000, not a single case of waste, fraud or
abuse in weapon system acquisitions will be reported in
the Air Force, and not a single weapon procured. Total
control results in total immobility.
-Colonel Gene Bartlow
Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff
for RD&A in 1986 [Ref. 12]
The military departments dutifully began to implement DEP procedures in
the designated programs in 1987. However, many obstacles were encountered
that led to the situation where many DoD acquisition staff believed that
designation as a Defense Enterprise Program, as it was executed, ". . . provided
little-to-no gains to participating programs in terms of efficiency and
effectiveness." [Ref. 33:p. 14]
The Navy SSN-21 Seawolf program office did report some limited success
with the program. This office utilized the regulatory relief provision of the
DEP to set-aside regulations ". . . presumed to apply but, in fact, of little
relevance". [Ref. 36] Analysis of this limited instance of successful
implementation is provided in Chapter V.
Overall, the ". . . experience with DEPs to date has been less than
successful in the eyes of the Services, DoD, and Congress." [Ref. 33:p. 1] In
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1988, OSD requested the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) to review and
report on the effectiveness of the DoD response to Packard Commission
recommendations including the DEP. After completing analysis of recent DoD
reforms aimed at streamlining the DoD acquisition process and interviews
with acquisition personnel, IDA published a report titled "Defense Acquisition:
Observations Two Years After the Packard Commission". It concluded that:
Enterprise programs offer a useful approach for experimenting with
alternative regulatory arrangements. They also offer an area where concrete
progress might be made. However, even though Congress passed enabling
legislation two years ago, not much has happened to permit DEP managers
to operate in the way that the Packard Commission recommended.
Relentless pressure from the Under Secretary [USD /A] appears to be
needed to permit Defense Enterprise Programs to be used as test cases for
Packard recommendations. [Ref. 2:p. VIII-14]
In July 1989, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Cheney's Defense
Management Report (DMR) to the President again called attention to the
absence of DEP success in achieving program fiscal or managerial
improvements. In describing the potential advantages of using the
management-by-exception principle, Cheney noted that DoD had not
effectively utilized the DEP. He ordered:
. . . the USD /A, with the SAEs [to] carefully select several new Defense
Enterprise Programs from programs in the DAB's Concept Approval (post-
Milestone I) phase, provide strong policy direction and oversight in
implementing the DEP concept, and seek milestone authorization for such
programs to enhance management stability. [Ref. 38:p. 12]
The Defense Enterprise Program Working Group, convened by USD/A in
1989, expressed concerns with revitalization of the DEP in a report issued soon
after the release of the DMR. The group questioned the wisdom of pursuing
66
and reporting reforms in an initiative that applied only to a limited number of
programs while other similar reforms sought to achieve similar benefits for
DoD-wide programs. It was also concerned that an important advantage of
the DEP, milestone-authorization, could not be implemented given the current
turmoil in the budget. [Ref. 33:p. 4]
The report of this group helped stall the revitalization effort by concluding,
with the concurrence of USD/A, that ". . . no new DEPs should be designated
until the budget and force structure begins to stabilize, the DMR regulatory
reduction effort is complete or at least the end result is known." [Ref. 33:p.
ES2)
The SASC became disappointed with DoD attempts to implement the DEP.
[Ref. 16] It chided DoD for ineffective pursuit of the potential benefits of
DEPs, stating in the report on the 1992/93 National Defense Authorization Act
that DoD:
. . . has done nothing to implement either Defense Enterprise Programs or
the milestone authorization process. Notwithstanding the promise in the
Defense Management Review to make greater use of these authorities,
neither of the Department's last two budget requests sought Defense
Enterprise Program status or milestone authorizations for any program. The
Department has informed the committee that there are no plans to
implement or utilize these provisions to enhance the management process in
the Department. [Ref. 5:p. 2641
The impediments to effective DEP implementation must to be understood.
Careful analysis of the causes of DEP failure to provide the level of relief
envisioned by its creators may enhance understanding of potential
impediments to implementation. Understanding and avoiding these pitfalls
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may improve the opportunity for successful implementation and execution of
future reforms.
Subsequent analysis shows that the DoD organizational environment
encountered by the DEPs was not conducive to effective implementation or
execution of the DEP charter. The DEP initiative experienced resistance to the
execution of each of its pillars. [Ref. 2:p. VII-1]
Evidence presented in this chapter supports the hypothesis that a delay of
policy guidance early in the implementation process and absence of effective
DEP advocacy from above the program management level, hampered effective
DEP implementation and execution. Additional factors contributed to the
ineffectiveness of the DEP. Acquisition organization resistance to changes in
the oversight process also threatened prospects for reduced regulation in mid-
and upper-levels of acquisition management. [Ref. 2:p. V-4]
Early in DEP implementation, wide-spread confusion at the program
manager level over which regulations were automatically waived contributed
to ineffective DEP execution. This confusion delayed benefits to DEP-
designated programs and resulted in misapplication of initiative intent by the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD/ A). [Ref. 33:pp. 1-2] The
causes of DEP failure are discussed in the following sections.
A. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Many circumstances and events had an impact on implementation and
execution of the DEP. Analysis in the following sections indicates that DEP
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effectiveness was significantly hampered by OSD choice of designated
programs and by the absence of early implementing guidance. The political
climate of the time and organizational resistance to change also contributed
significantly to the demise of the DEP.
1. Program Selection
a. Large Cost
Interviews with personnel in DEP and acquisition management offices
encountered the general opinion that relatively larger DEPs (ACAT I) attracted
proportionately more attention and oversight than ACAT II or ACAT in
programs. [Refs. 34, 35, 37, 39, 40] One explanation for the desire to maintain
the existing level of oversight of large programs was the relatively large
potential cost of errors. The 10 DEPs designated in 1987 were not optimal
choices because they comprised a significant portion of the entire DoD
acquisition budget. The DEP Working Group supported this hypothesis by
adding its recommendation that the programs chosen for designation as a DEP
".
. . should not be limited [to] the most expensive or 'lead' program in a
service . . . because they attract the most outside interest." [Ref. 33:p. 7]
The large size of the designated DEPs generated resistance within the
acquisition organization because of the increased risk of applying the
unconventional managerial methods of the DEP. An error caused by reduced
oversight of a large DEP would effect a significant portion of any military
department budget. This risk induced organizational resistance that hindered
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effective execution of the "hands-off ' or management-by-exception concepts
contained within the DEP.
b. Late Designation
The relatively late stage in the acquisition process at which DEPs were
designated was another factor that hindered DEP implementation, especially
for milestone-authorized programs. Late designation of DEP concepts
permitted less time for program efficiency benefits and monetary savings to
accrue. The lack of tangible benefits, early-on, provided evaluators of this
reform with reason to question the viability of the DEP. [Refs. 34, 41]
The SASC also expressed concern over the DEPs selected for
milestone authorization. The SASC suggested that DoD might have chosen
programs in development to achieve greater cumulative benefit. [Ref. 42:p. 19]
However, the initial guidance issued by the USD/A office conflicted
with the SASC recommendation. The first DEP memorandum of USD/A
Godwin (Appendix D) indicates the choice to restrict DEP designation to
programs in the later acquisition phases where budget stability was higher and
technical risk lower. [Ref. 32] This rationale seemed practical from the OSD
viewpoint, especially when considering the experimental nature of the DEP. A
trade-off was made between designating programs later in their acquisition
timeline where program risk was lower but where reduced benefits would
accrue and designation earlier where risk was higher but greater opportunity
for benefits to accrue was present.
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2. Paucity of Early Guidance
One study of the DEP indicated that the lack of early implementation
guidance was an issue that contributed to the lack of DEP success. [Ref. 33:p.
4] Depending on the military department, DEPs were designated and
executed for six months to one year with only the original statute, the SASC
report on the 1987 National Defense Authorization Act and two confusing
USD/A memorandums, available for guidance. The lack of early guidance left
DEP managers to their own initiative to determine the method of
implementing the DEP charter.
The USD/A implementing guidance that was provided to program
managers conflicted with the DEP statute regarding automatic waiver of
regulations. One USD/A memo indicated that all regulations would apply
until reviewed and waived individually by USD/A. Program offices were,
therefore, faced with the dilemma of rapidly implementing the revolutionary
DEP concept while relying on confusing and conflicting sources for guidance.
Managers were unsure of the extent of their charter and hesitant to
operate under the assumption that the full waiver authority of this initiative,
as granted in law, was in effect. [Refs. 18, 22, 27, 34, 37] The unenthusiastic
pursuit of DEP implementation may have allowed other factors including
military acquisition staff resistance exert a negative influence on the
development of the initiative. [Ref. 16]
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Air Force implementing guidance came slightly more than one year after
the DEP was authorized. [Ref. 43] The Air Force commenced a six month
study to determine which regulations could be waived. Another six months
elapsed while the Air Force staff determined which regulations would be
waived.
One and one-half years Congress passed after the DEP statute, the Army
and Navy issued their official guidance for DEPs. [Refs. 44, 45] The lengthy
delays in providing military department guidance to the DEPs already
designated delayed implementation of DEP concept. This reduced the benefits
of regulatory relief in the early years. [Ref. 37] The lack of early success in
regulatory relief for DEP managers also hindered DEP effectiveness.
The DEP reform lost momentum in the crucial years. [Ref. 18] The loss
of interest allowed acquisition reform proponents the opportunity to support
new initiatives. Without interest and high-level attention, chances for
successful DEP implementation quickly ebbed [Ref. 2:p. V-4]
3. Political Environment
Two major political circumstances shaped the outcome of the DEP.
General resistance to Packard Commission reforms hindered effective
implementation and execution of the DEP initiative. Also, at the same time the
DEPs were being instituted, the newly created position of Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition was being established. The political struggle to collect
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and consolidate power in the USD/A position interfered with DEP
implementation.
a. Organizational Resistance
Some critics in DoD believe that the constant reform of the DoD
acquisition system in the 1980's was too much for the organization to manage
successfully. [Ref. 2:p. VII-1] They point to the overwhelming volume of
acquisition transactions that occurred despite the inefficiencies in the system.
Reluctance to tinker with the system that many believed was not "broken"
caused resistance to implementation of improvements recommended by the
Packard Commission, including the DEP. [Ref. 2:p. VII-4] [Ref. 18, 37]
Interviews conducted with DoD personnel by IDA two years after the
Packard Commission still found ". . . no strong consensus on what the most
importance acquisition problems were, or on their sources." [Ref. 2:p. VH-2]
Disagreement over acquisition problems and their causes resulted in equally
diverse solutions. Within the DoD organization, there are some that ". . .
believe the system requires close oversight." [Ref. 2:p. VII-21] This belief
naturally led to resistance to a reform like the DEP that called for less
oversight. [Ref. 33:p. 2] Although not overt, this resistance may have
contributed to what some term "DoD foot-dragging" in implementation of the
DEP. [Ref. 16] The IDA study concluded that organizational resistance to DEP
concepts hindered successful DEP implementation by contributing to the delay
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in generating implementation guidance by the military departments. [Ref. 2:p.
VIII-3]
b. Lack of an Effective Reform Advocate
The DEP also suffered because it had no effective high-level
proponent within DoD. [Ref. 2:p. V-4] The President did, however, vigorously
support Packard Commission recommendations. He issued National Security
Decision Directive 219 that outlined the "steps approved for implementation of
the initial recommendations" and urged DoD to "move quickly and decisively
to implement those changes approved [by the Commissionl." [Ref. 15:p. 34]
But, no one in a high-level position in DoD took specific responsibility for the
DEP outcome in the crucial, early stage of implementation. [Ref. 2:p. 11-11]
Research in the field of organizational change indicates that if a
reform is to succeed, it must have a dedicated and highly-placed proponent
that is willing to expend considerable effort to take the steps necessary to
make the reform succeed. [Ref. 2:p. V-4] Emphasis and interest from above
makes the reform more important to the executors and compels them to try
harder to make the reform succeed. [Ref. 34]
The IDA report on of the status of Packard Commission
recommendations identified the absence of a high-level advocate for the DEP
initiative as evidence of a weak implementation effort. After lauding potential
merit of the DEP, it commented on its virtual lack of success. The report
noted the absence of a reform advocate within DoD and concluded that,
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"relentless pressure from the Under Secretary [USD/A] appears to be needed
to permit Defense Enterprise Programs to be used as test cases for Packard
recommendations." [Ref. 2:p. Vffl-14]
Months later, Secretary Cheney, hoping to improve the effectiveness
of the DEP, assigned direct responsibility for such advocacy. He directed
USD/A and SAEs to ". . . provide strong policy direction and oversight in
implementing the DEP concept . . . ." [Ref. 38 :p. 12] Unfortunately, this high-
level interest was not present during the early implementation stage when
expectations of DEP success were formed. Early DEP ineffectiveness permitted
those who resisted implementation to allege the uselessness of the reform,
thereby sowing the seeds for its failure. [Ref. 16]
c. New Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Position
USD/A Godwin was unable to realistically assume the advocate role
initially because the USD/A position was also under development. Congress
appointed Richard Godwin as the first USD/A in September 1986, shortly
before enactment of DEP legislation. Dedicated to making USD/A the focal
point in determining DoD acquisition policy, Godwin bruskly attempted to
bring about a major cultural change within DoD. He advocated a departure
from consensus-building, decision making practices that were entrenched in
the DoD organization. [Ref. 2:p. II-8] His new management approach relied
heavily upon the more commercially-accepted, delegation of authority precept.
[Ref. 2:p. II-9]
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Understandably, the primary mission of the new USD/A was the
management of the genesis of his own organization in all respects (politically,
functionally, administratively, etc.,). Because this task consumed the vast
majority of Mr. Godwin's time, he may have been unable to devote the
political energy and attention the fledgling DEP needed to be successfully
implemented within DoD. [Ref. 2:pp. 11-9-11]
Analysis in subsequent sections indicates the overt attempts of the
USD/A office to gather authority and influence over the acquisition
organization. It also demonstrates the underlying intent to establish the power
and authority of USD/A over military department acquisition organizations.
The resultant power struggle interfered with DEP implementation.
Mr. Godwin resigned in September 1987 after a year-long struggle
with the DoD organization to establish the USD/A position. He reportedly
resigned because he believed DoD was not committed to bringing about
desperately needed changes, and because he faced the unyielding resistance of
the military departments to the empowerment of the USD/A position. [Ref.
2:p. 11-10]
The HASC highlighted the shortcomings of Mr. Godwin that they
believed precluded him from accomplishing his goal of redefining the DoD
acquisition hierarchy. These shortcomings may also explain why Mr. Godwin
was ineffective as a DEP advocate. The HASC concluded:
Because Mr. Godwin came to his position without experience in either
Pentagon politics or the hundreds of acquisition issues within his
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jurisdiction, he found himself at a disadvantage when dealing with his
subordinate organizations and officials within the Department of Defense . .
. Thus, Mr Godwin who intended to devote himself to constructing a new
DoD acquisition system, found that he has to spend much of his time
fighting to gain the authority needed to accomplish his tasks. [Ref. 2:p. 11-11]
The untimely void in the acquisition hierarchy created by the
departure of Mr. Godwin also left a void in DEP advocacy at a crucial stage of
implementation. More importantly, the delegation of authority concept, the
cornerstone of Mr. Godwin's acquisition policies and the DEP, was no longer
the guiding principle that flowed from the leader of defense acquisition. [Ref.
2:p. 11-10]
The new USD/A, Robert Costello, focused initially on smaller issues,
unrelated to the DEP, such as manufacturing and industrial efficiencies.
However, not all of his focus shifted from DEP concepts. He endorsed the
pursuit of regulatory reform in an article describing 10 goals for improving
defense acquisition. [Ref. 2:p. 11-12]
Mr. Costello may not have been much more effective than Godwin as
advocate because he was selected very late in the tenure of the Reagan
administration. [Ref. 2:p. 62] His tenure as USD/A was expected to be short
by the DoD organization. Interviews indicated that the acquisition community
tended to "slow-roll" or stall his major reform initiatives while conceding on
the smaller ones for appearances only. [Ref. 35] Therefore, USD/A Costello
was not able to provide effective support as a DEP advocate either.
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4. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Misdirection of
Defense Enterprise Program Intent
Early USD/A involvement in the DEP had a crucial effect that
contributed to its less-than-desirable outcome. Policy guidance in the early
stages of implementation significantly altered statutory DEP procedures.
Analysis of two major changes in the DEP concept instituted by USD/A
reveals the struggle to centralize power and attempts to establish the new
USD/A position. The USD/A office usurped the SAE statutory authority to
designate DEPs, and then unilaterally altered DEP procedures. [Refs. 16, 34]
a. Assumption of Power
The first memorandum distributed by USD/A Godwin on the DEP
(Appendix D) usurped SAE statutory authority to designate DEP programs.
The last paragraph of the memo directed the SAEs to recommend DEP
candidates . The term candidates indicates the intent to claim the power of
DEP designation for the USD/A position. The memo required the SAEs to
submit at least three candidate programs from their military departments to
the Joint Requirements Management Board (now Defense Acquisition Board),
which was controlled by the USD/A. [Ref. 32] This overt power maneuver
went without significant challenge by the military departments, for reasons
that are not well understood.
b. Procedural Modification
The second and more important action instigated by USD/A in the
early phase of the DEP was major modification of statutory DEP
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implementation procedures. In a memorandum to the military department
secretaries on 27 April 1987 (Appendix F), USD/A Godwin announced the
programs he designated as DEPs and those recommended to Congress for
milestone-authorization. The memo also forwarded USD/A "Guidelines for
the Management of the Defense Enterprise Programs" as an attachment.
This USD/A memorandum ignored the DEP statutory edict
authorizing automatic waiver of all regulations, policy, rules and guidelines
(excluding statute-based rules). USD/A unilaterally required the SAEs to
identify every regulation, directive, guideline and policy that would and
would not apply to DEPs. Additionally, USD/A required a formal assessment
of the organizational benefits that would be derived from each regulatory
waiver request within 45 days. In effect, this requirement created more
paperwork for a initiative that was supposed to cut red tape. Even though
USD/A Godwin advocated delegation of authority, this action indicates that he
desired centralized oversight and control of acquisition programs. [Ref. 46]
It is crucial to note the effect of this policy change. USD/A shifted
the burden of proof for each regulatory waiver request to the SAEs and,
ultimately, program management offices. Essentially, the USD/A instituted a
disincentive system that ultimately condemned the DEP to failure by requiring
extra managerial work and burden to gain each regulatory waiver.
The final result was imposition of further burden on the very
personnel the law intended to unburden! This policy change was challenged
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by the military departments. Each military department Secretary subsequently,
albeit late, provided his own guidance for DEP procedures.
The ensuing debate and struggle for control between the military
departments and USD/A resulted in further confusion at the program
management level. This confusion left execution of the DEP in a state of
paralysis that contributed to the overall ineffectiveness for the initiative. [Refs.
22, 27, 34]
In the end, USD/A won the battle over the applicability of regulatory
waivers. In the 1988/89 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress
confirmed the waiver authority of the USD/A over the military departments.
This Authorization Act amended the regulatory provision in the original DEP
statute that provided regulatory relief "except as specified by the senior
procurement executive of the military department concerned" by adding the
phrase "with the approval of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition"
to the end of the sentence. [Ref. 48:p. 1125] This was reportedly done in an
attempt to show congressional support for USD/A Godwin as he tried to
establish the new USD/A position. [Ref. 47]
Analysis of subsequent military department implementation
memoranda indicate that the SAEs maintained authority to waive only military
department regulations while USD/A maintained authority to waive DoD-
level regulations. This effectively split the responsibility for regulatory waiver
and complicated the regulatory relief provision. [Refs. 44, 43, 45]
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Confusion over whether waiver of regulations needed to be justified
instead of waived automatically, and questions about who maintained waiver
authority over which regulations, may have made program managers reluctant
to apply the full statutory waiver authority of the DEP provisions. [Refs. 18,
34] This conservative application of the regulatory provision reduced benefits
for the programs. The minimal amount of regulatory relief obtained in the
early stages of implementation contributed to the dwindling of DoD interest in
DEPs. [Ref. 39] Problems with each of the DEP pillars also frustrated DEP
execution.
B. REGULATORY ISSUES
The majority of staff interviewed in program and acquisition management
offices in research for this thesis in 1992 indicated that designation as a DEP
provided little or no real regulatory or reporting relief. They reported almost
all of the existing regulations still apply to programs despite the waiver
supplied by the congressional authorization committees (except those based in
statute). [Refs. 18, 22, 27, 34, 35]
Two major regulatory issues hindered the effective execution of the DEP.
The existing regulatory framework was a morass of multi-tiered references and
complex interrelationships. This made it very difficult for the USD/A, SAEs
and program managers to determine which regulations were and were not
based in statute and, therefore, were eligible for waiver. [Ref. 2:p. V-3] The
DEP did not permit waiver of regulatory requirements based in statute,
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whichever DEP implementation procedure was used (automatic or justified
waiver of regulations).
Once a determination was made by the military departments of which
DoD-level regulations were eligible for waiver, it was necessary to decide if a
waiver was desired. An advocate for every "waiverable" regulation inevitably
appeared, challenging requests to eliminated "vital" regulations. [Ref. 2:p. V-4]
The unilateral USD/A requirement for SAEs and program managers to justify
their requests for waiver of each regulation and provide an analysis of the
expected benefits was a disincentive to pursue any waiver at all.
Each military department began to develop guidance for DEP
implementation. The military department-level guidance that followed
provided lists of military department-specific regulations that were waived.
1. The Air Force Approach
The Air Force led the way in developing a method of determining which
rules and regulations were based in statute. It contracted consultants and
assigned members of its own military department to conduct a study of the
existing regulatory framework. The goal was development of methods to
facilitate the identification of rules and regulations eligible for waiver.
The study produced a computerized, acquisition regulation, data base.
This computerized system determined the relationships between each
regulation and the FAR, DFARS, Air Force acquisition regulations and existing
statutes. [Ref. 49:pp. 1-2]
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This tool was used to review and analyze approximately 2000 acquisition
references and 300 interrelationships of DoD and military department
regulations and legal statutes. Although developed to support Air Force DEPs,
this data base was capable of being expanded to include the regulations of
other military departments as well.
This data base was truly helpful to the Air Force and DoD for
determining which statutes were based in law. [Ref. 34] Unfortunately, it took
more than six months to develop. Another six months passed before the Air
Force review of the eligible regulations was complete. Only then were Air
Force DEPs provided with concrete guidance on which Air Force regulatory
waivers were authorized.
The Air Force Acquisition Executive granted waiver for roughly two-
thirds of the Air Force regulation waiver requests. In the implementing
memorandum, he also expressed his personal disbelief that:
we have identified all the regulatory requirements that can and should be
eliminated ... [I] request each DEP program director and PEO to review the
remaining regulatory requirements . . . with the purpose of further reducing
regulatory requirements impeding effective program accomplishment. [Ref.
43]
The delay in implementing this major pillar delayed the ability of Air
Force DEPs to achieve fiscal and managerial benefits. This contributed to the
early impotence of the DEP.
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2. The Army Approach
The Army did not undertake a similar regulatory study [Ref. 2:p. V-4].
However, when the Army published implementing guidance nearly one-year
after Army DEPs were designated, it came closest to instituting the genuine
intent of Congress and the DEP statute.
The implementing guidance of the Army provided blanket waiver of all
Army regulations, policies, directives and administrative rules eligible under
DEP legislative guidelines. The Army FAR Supplement and subordinate
supplements were specifically included in the waiver. [Ref. 44] The blanket
waiver of the Army comes closet to implementing the true intent of Congress
to grant regulatory relief. However this was partially ineffective because most
DoD-level regulations continued to apply.
The Army implementing memorandum also changed ". . . the burden of
proof as to whether any existing regulation herein waived necessarily derives
from law, FAR or DFARS and therefore remains applicable to the DEP, will
fall of the proponent of the requirement . . . ." [Ref. 44] Furthermore, the
Army Acquisition Executive directed program managers to "challenge"
regulations and procedures in a proactive attempt to unburden the program
manager and institute their perception of the intent of the law. [Ref. 44]
3. The Navy Approach
The Navy approach was quite different. The Navy commenced a study
in May 1987 to determine which regulations it could and would waiver. The
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study unfortunately focused only on required reports. It concluded that, of the
22 most common reports, 13 were required by law and 3 by the FAR or OMB
circular. The Navy study reported that ". . . of the remaining 6, 4 are decision
documents that are so useful to our program managers that they feel they
would prepare and utilize them even if they weren't required." [Ref. 50] As a
result, Navy DEPs experienced virtually no regulatory relief. [Ref. 21, 37]
The Navy implementing memorandum, published nearly one-year after
its DEPs were designated, specifically required continued submission of many
of the large reports and reviews. Initial relief for Navy DEPs, provided in the
implementing memorandum, consisted of the "promised" benefit of having
their review process of the required acquisition documentation shortened. [Ref.
45] The bulk of the Navy implementation memorandum focused on revising
the format of the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)--a document required by
statute!
4. Outcome of Department of Defense-Level Waiver Requests
Waiver requests at the OSD level did not fare as well. Interviews with
USD/A staff indicated that when requests of waiver of OSD-level regulations
were forwarded by the military departments, functional advocates also came
forward to defend the appropriateness of every regulation. [Refs. 18, 34] Other
research also found that ". . . every waiver was opposed by at least one
member of the . . . staff." [Ref. 2:p. V-4]
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Resistance to each regulatory waiver at the DoD-level made it difficult
for DEP managers to obtain waivers. [Ref. 39] This resistance was clearly at
variance with the law which waived all regulations not based in statute in the
FAR or DFARS. Because many of the regulations waived at the military
department level were required at the OSD level, the limited application of the
regulatory relief provision, inconsistent with the statute, did not allow enough
fiscal or managerial benefit to accumulate for DEP management offices to
make the program a success.
An additional concern regarding audits of programs and the relationship
to the regulation system came to light during interviews with program
management staff. Interviewees expressed concern over auditor /inspector
findings and recommendations forwarded in the final reports. Interviewees
expressed concern that a DEP, benefitting from regulatory waiver, might later
exceed their budget baselines. They feared that auditors would point to the
regulatory waiver as the cause for the deviation. They were unsure whether
this would reflect poorly on the program manager who requested the
regulatory waiver. [Refs. 21, 27, 34] This incentive to maintain existing
regulatory requirements helps explain the reluctance of program managers to
request waivers of regulations in potentially risky areas of their programs. The
understandably conservative application of waiver authority by the program
manager led to conservative fiscal and managerial benefits for the programs.
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C. REPORTING ISSUES
The Packard Commission recognized that program managers had become
buried under excessive layers of management. They recommended that ". . .
by trimming the layers of management to a maximum of four and having the
program managers take direction from this short line of command only . . .
they would receive more definite decisions more rapidly, they would have
fewer diversions, and they could give greater attention to program
management." [Ref. 2:p. 60]
Results of research on implementation of Packard Commission
recommendations determined that, although theoretically sound, the military
departments were not able to execute the streamlined chain-of-command
envisioned by the Packard Commission members or DEP originators. Program
managers received virtually no reporting relief from DoD institutionalization of
the streamlined chain-of-command concept. [Ref. 2:p. 66]
The streamlined management pillar of the DEP also attempted to institute
management-by-exception principle in DoD acquisition programs.
Institutionalization of management-by-exception was intended to allow
managers to execute their programs between milestone without significant
oversight interruptions from DoD, the military departments or Congress.
Oversight reporting requirements continued to include periodic reviews,
briefs, and requirements to check decisions through various staffs and higher
levels in the chain-of-command for concurrence. It also included reports to
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higher levels of management that detailed the managerial execution of a
program.
1. Streamlined Management Not Fully Implemented
In 1989, USD/A John Betti reached the conclusion in his attempt to
revitalize the DEP that the streamlined management structure was not
effectively implemented within DoD. He noted that "... streamlined
management and reporting [was] written into program structures but not
practiced. In most cases, DEPs received more scrutiny rather that less." [Ref. 41
DEP managers were faced with the dilemma of implementing the
streamlined management /reporting relief pillar of the DEP into the
organizational culture of the DoD acquisition system. Although streamlined
management existed for DEPs as a concept, thesis interviews indicated that a
"shadow" or unofficial line-of-communication paralleled the experimentally
streamlined chain-of-command instituted by the DEP statute. [Refs. 18, 21, 27,
34, 35, 371 A shadow line-of-communication is a duplicative unofficial
reporting chain that is usually based on informal oversight requirements. This
unofficial chain formed in response to organizational resistance to reduced
oversight. The existence two reporting chains created a great deal of
ambiguity as to the lines of authority and responsibility for a program
management office. [Ref. 2:p. 62]
The report published by the Institute for Defense Analysis commented
that the DoD streamlining efforts had:
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. . . failed to achieve the desired improvement; one major cause of this
failure is that the attempts at streamlining were conducted with far too
much concern about disturbing the current organization. Consequently,
relationships, responsibilities, and authorities have changed very little. Few
people, if any, have been removed from the process, and program managers
do not consider their tasks any less difficult ... it appears that the lack of
improvement seems attributable to less-than-adequate implementation
efforts—much more could be done to streamline the system. [Ref. 2:p. 60]
Implementation of the streamlined management structure overlaid the
existing reporting and management structure. This had the perverse effect of
increasing reporting requirements for the program manager. [Ref. 2:p. 62] It is
postulated that the ambiguity of authority and resultant increase in workload
was a significant flaw in DEP execution.
Some of the existing reporting requirements came from staff above the
program management level in the "shadow" line-of-communication. Their
"direction" and guidance came in the form of requirements, often focused on
obtaining compliance with one particular aspect of a program while
disregarding the multitude of complex trade-offs usually required to satisfy the
unofficial requirement. [Ref. 2:p. 62]
The streamlined management structure mandated by DEP legislation was
generally ineffective in reducing the number of reports requested. Program
managers indicated that they often satisfied reporting requirements that were
not formally required rather than challenging their validity ". . . because it is
not clear what authority these people have." [Ref. 2:p. 62]
Despite DEP procedures calling for institutionalization of streamlined
management and annual PEO performance evaluation of the program
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manager, the upper layers of military department and DoD management had
informal power to maintain the same oversight requirements that existed
before DEP implementation. DEP managers may have been given an incentive
to permit the "shadow" line-of-communication to exist, despite the law,
because the continued career success (promotion) and future assignments of
military managers was controlled exclusively by upper-level, military
department management.
The inevitability of future conflict within the "organization" meant that it
was not in the best interests of program managers to "rock-the-boat", insisting
upon reporting only via the streamlined reporting chain mandated by DEP
legislation. [Refs. 18, 22, 27] This presented the manager with a great deal of
incentive for cooperation with requests to maintain existing oversight
requirements and to apply a loose interpretation of the streamlined, chain-of-
command concept.
The inability to streamline management to reduce program reporting
requirements made acquisition personnel question the validity of continuing
pursuit of the DEP initiative. [Ref. 16, 34, 41] Degeneration of the DEP
support base within DoD contributed to the general attitude that the DEP
might not be capable of working.
2. Resistance to Reduced Reporting Oversight
The program managers and supporters of the oversight and reporting
status quo had incentive to resist execution of the streamlined DEP reporting
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chain-of-command. The defenders of maintaining existing reporting
requirements were fearful that programs might get out of control if oversight
reporting was eliminated. [Refs. 16, 35] For this reason, oversight advocates
actively sought to maintain requirements by objecting to their removal at every
stage of the process. Program management, on the other hand, enjoyed the
"protection" of implied consensus that extensive reporting provided and,
therefore, had incentive to at least passively resist reducing reporting oversight
requirements. [Refs. 16, 18, 34, 35]
DEPs were an experiment to fully apply the management-by-exception
principle in DoD acquisition programs. They were dedicated to the
"elimination of duplicative or unnecessary functions and management layers
and to the achievement of substantial reductions in overall staffing." [Ref. 38:p.
10] However, many of the reporting requirements managers suggested for
waiver were mandated by law and ineligible for elimination. [Ref. 2:p. VIM]
The lack of success in reducing the burden of program reporting requirements
contributed to the uncertainty of DoD about the continued viability of the
DEP.
The commitment of Congress to management-by-exception principles
also was unclear. While one faction of Congress was trying to reduce the
burden of the control over program management, another continued to expect
DoD management to maintain the same detailed knowledge of acquisition
programs as before. [Ref. 34] Mid-management may have resisted reduced
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reporting especially since DoD executives and Congress were unaffected by the
reduction. Because of this divergence of congressional preference,
management above the program manager level resisted attempts to reduce the
information they received.
The Defense Management Report highlighted the degree of congressional
micromanagement. It reported that members of Congress request or make:
Every working day ... on average almost 3 new General Accounting Office
(GAO) audits of DoD; an estimated 450 written inquiries and over 2,500
telephone inquiries from Capitol Hill; and nearly 3 separate reports to
Congress each averaging over 1,000 man-hours in preparation and
approximately $ 50,000 in cost. In addition, senior DoD officials spend
upwards of 40 hours preparing for the 6 appearances as witnesses and the
14 hours of testimony that they provide on average for each day Congress is
in session. [Ref. 38:p. 27]
An effective reduction in oversight at the program management level
might be accomplished without reducing the requirement for some parts of
DoD management to collect and maintain detailed data on acquisition
programs. However, the DEP was not effective in reducing oversight because
it did not limit the reporting and oversight requirements of DoD management
to, in turn, satisfy requests for information from organizations outside DoD,
e.g., GAO, CBO, Congress.
Also sensitive to attempts to institute streamlined management and a
reduce program reporting under the DEP were DoD budget officials. Budget
execution has a broad effect on DoD acquisition programs. The sensitivity of
the DoD comptroller was due in part to the relative size and dynamic nature
of the budget for the DEPs. Improper program budget execution can result in
92
criminal prosecution under the Anti-Deficiency Act. Detailed, up-to-date fiscal
reporting is required to prevent errors. This may explain financial community
resistance to implementation of reduced reporting requirements under the
DEP.
Program management offices also had incentive to passively resist
institutionalization of streamlined management and reduction in reporting
requirements. Although reporting requirements definitely increase
administrative burden, some program management officers might have
considered reporting requirements an advantage. [Ref. 16] Reporting
requirements spread some small portion of program responsibility to their
superiors who received the reports, reviews or briefings granting tacit
approval. Program management offices had incentive to involve the higher
levels of management in their responsibility so that there might always be
someone else, partially responsible by virtue of a brief or having received a
report, to share the blame if something went wrong with the program. [Refs.
16, 21, 34, 35]
D. MILESTONE-AUTHORIZATION ISSUES
Funding stability can improve managerial efficiency. [Ref 38:p. 10] Even
members of Congress acknowledge that future fiscal stability can lead to
improvements in execution of acquisition programs. [Ref. 51 :p. 744] However,
fiscal stability is difficult to implement within DoD especially since the PPBS
function lies outside prerogatives of the streamlined, chain-of-command.
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Milestone-to-milestone authorization of DEPs was a short-lived concept.
Milestone-authorization commitments for four programs (T-45TS, TRIDENT D-
5, MSE, ATACMS) were granted in the 1988-89 National Defense
Authorization Act. Milestone-authorization was rescinded for all four
programs less than three years later by Congress in disappointment due to the
perception of poor DoD execution of this initiative. [Ref. 39:p. 482]
Milestone-authorized DEPs observed little improvement in managerial
efficiency from their intended reprieve from justifying and defending budget
submissions because Congress failed to provide milestone-appropriations to
accompany the milestone-authorization. [Refs. 18, 39] The disappointing
outcome of the initial four milestone-authorized DEPs soured DoD and
Congress on this concept. [Ref. 16]
1. Inappropriate Program Selection
The DEPs chosen for milestone-funding may have been poor choices.
USD/A Godwin disregarded staff advice and allowed major acquisition
programs to be chosen for his initial recommendations for milestone-
authorization. By selecting relatively high cost programs, he generated
substantial resistance from factions within DoD that significantly hindered
execution of this pillar and, therefore, harmed effectiveness of the DEP in
general. [Ref. 34]
The DEP Working Group supported the assertion in its study of the DEP
that the initial programs selected were too large. It reported, ". . . there was a
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general feeling that major defense programs may not be the best pool to pick
DEPs from because of their high visibility and the high dollar values involved
that would have to be stabilized." [Ref. 34:p. 10]
Funds of milestone-authorized programs were "fenced" or protected over
a specific period of time. The funding profile was tied to spending levels
predicted in the program baseline. Changes to the funding profile of a
milestone-authorized program could only be changed by congressional action.
As noted earlier, fiscal stability may produce an increase in managerial
efficiency. However, in times of declining budgets such as the late 1980' s,
stabilizing the future funding profile of a program in law might cause an even
greater budgetary impact on non-protected programs. This was an important
factor that contributed to resistance within DoD.
Non-protected programs would be required to absorb more than their
"fair" share of budget decrement during a general budget decline while
protected programs escaped without any loss of funding. "Fencing" programs
also restricted DoD and military department ability to redirect and control
their respective acquisition strategies in response to the changing budgetary
environment.
Two of the milestone-authorized programs, T-45TS and ATACMS, were
not even recommended by the military departments or DoD as candidates for
milestone-authorization. A member of SASC staff reported that these two
programs were designated by Congress to overcome DoD "foot-dragging" in
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an attempt "to push the initiative along." [Ref. 47] These two congressionally
selected programs also proved to be inappropriate choices because they
involved greater technical risk than was initially assessed. Each eventually
exceeded their budget baselines.
Initial underestimation of the technical risks some milestone-authorized
programs caused decision makers to choose inappropriate programs.
Subsequent baseline deviations of all milestone-authorized DEPs may have
caused the initiative to lose credibility as a functional reform by attracting
negative attention.
2. Baseline Deviation Procedures
All four programs deviated from their baselines within two years of their
milestone-authorization. This triggered the requirement for Secretary of
Defense action to conduct a significant review of the program. This
burdensome procedure added a great deal of work to program management
offices that already were experiencing trouble.
Some program management offices eventually resented milestone-
authorization status because of the additional administrative workload
imposed on them by events, beyond their control, e.g., budget breaches due to
technical difficulties. [Refs. 22, 27, 40] Status as a milestone-authorized DEP
was the sole cause for the additional workload.
DEP status also made it possible, under special circumstances, for
programs to face automatic, instantaneous loss of fund obligation authority.
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At the very least, programs that deviated from their baseline had their
milestone-authorization privilege automatically withdrawn for the next fiscal
year. The baseline-deviation process proved to be "so painful" for the DEP
managers, military departments and OSD that USD/A chose to let this reform
opportunity "die on the vine" after the initial attempt. DoD did not submit
any additional milestone-candidates after the initial set. [Refs. 18, 33, 341
Another factor that contributed to the general demise of the milestone-
authorization concept was the failure of Congress to grant greater flexibility to
these programs. [Ref. 40] Congress authorized some, but not enough,
flexibility for milestone-authorized DEPs in the 1988/89 National Defense
Authorization Act by applying the same baseline flexibility criteria as "normal"
programs to milestone-authorized DEPs. [Ref. 48:p. 19] The reluctance of
Congress to extend even greater baseline flexibility to these experimental
programs limited the potential benefits to those enjoyed by non-designated
programs. It did, however, impose a penalty in the case of baseline deviation
for milestone-authorized programs that did not exist for non-designated
programs. Program managers viewed that the benefits of the milestone-
authorization "privilege" did not outweigh the cost.
3. Failure of Congress to Provide Appropriation
Milestone-authorization might have been a positive step toward
increasing managerial efficiency through fiscal stability. Unfortunately,
although the funding profiles of designated programs were fully authorized to
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the next milestone, appropriations were still defended, debated and approved
annually. The absence of milestone-appropriations to accompany milestone-
authorizations prevented the program manager from making or committing
firm plans because, ultimately, the amount of funds appropriated for his
program determined how much he could obligate in the future. Only when
armed with the appropriated amount could he establish future plans with
certainty.
The intended DEP benefit of reducing the number of program reviews
was not realized. Military department and DoD-level budget submissions and
reviews were still required for milestone authorized programs to satisfy
requirements of the budget process and congressional appropriation
committees. Therefore, little budget preparation reprieve was provided to the
milestone-authorized programs. [Refs. 34, 40, 491 Because the DoD acquisition
organization realized that there was little managerial or fiscal benefit and a
substantial amount of potential burden and risk due to baseline breach, its
support for milestone-authorization of DEPs quickly disappeared.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Interviews with program and acquisition management staff
acknowledged that DEP concepts provided little-or-no improvement in
managerial or fiscal efficiency. Chapter rV highlighted the causes of the DEP
failure to achieve the expected outcomes.
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Initial lackluster DEP results contributed significantly to the downfall of the
DEP initiative. Early ineffectiveness caused acquisition personnel with positive
expectations for DEP success to become discouraged and lose interest in the
reform. Little incentive existed for program staff to pursue the reform because
it provided very little benefit in return for their effort. This loss of interest and
lack of benefits were major contributors to the failure of the DEP.
The environment in which DEPs were established also hampered their
effectiveness. The causes of lackluster DEP performance appear to fall into
four broad problem categories:
1. Implementation failures by the DoD acquisition leadership
2. Regulatory reform resistance
3. Reporting reform resistance
4. Congressional failure to provide milestone-appropriation
Each program chosen for DEP and milestone-authorization designation was
a major acquisition program (ACAT I) and generated significant resistance to
reduced oversight by virtue of large program cost. Programs were also
designated relatively late in the acquisition cycle. Late designation prevented
full DEP benefits from accruing during the life of a designated program.
The DEPs were designated with very little implementation guidance.
Implementation instructions that were provided conflicted with the DEP
statute. This forced DEP managers to execute their programs while unsure of
which, if any, regulations were to be waived.
99
Organizational resistance to the DEP principles also hindered
implementation. Effective, high-level advocacy for the DEP might have helped
overcome resistance. Unfortunately, USD/A Godwin was unable to assume
this role and effectively assist because he was preoccupied with establishing
personal credibility and the USD/A position within the DoD hierarchy.
Misdirection of DEP intent while Mr. Godwin was USD/A significantly
hindered DEP implementation. USD/A guidance ignored the DEP statute that
authorized automatic waiver of DoD regulations and required the SAEs to
identify every regulation that would and would not apply. It also created a
disincentive for successful DEP execution by switching the burden of proof for
the decision to grant regulatory waivers from the regulation advocate to the
SAE and ultimately, the program manager. This disincentive may have caused
the failure of regulatory relief provision of the DEP.
Further, fiscal benefits or improvements in managerial efficiency from
regulatory waivers were delayed by DoD and military department difficulty in
determining which regulations were and were not based in statute. Finally,
when a regulation was determined to be eligible for waiver, parochial interests
in the DoD acquisition community objected to its elimination. The success of
the organizational resistance to reduce oversight successfully reduced the fiscal
and managerial benefits of the regulatory relief provision.
Disincentives for institutionalizing streamlined management and
management-by-exception principles in DEPs also contributed to its ineffective
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implementation and lack of benefits. Incentives may have existed for the
program manager to tolerate the redundant, "shadow" line-of-communication
that developed and its "requests" to maintain existing reporting requirements.
The existence of two parallel reporting chains fostered ambiguity of authority,
added work for program managers and frustrated the intent of streamlining
the chain-of-command relationships.
Budget baseline deviations in milestone-authorized DEPs damaged the
credibility of the milestone-authorization reform and added significant burden
to the military department and program manager. Ultimately, the failure of
this aspect of the DEP may have provided the greatest disappointment to DEP
supporters. Some staff in DoD resisted the milestone-authorization concept
because it protected ("fenced") program funding for selected DEPs. The fact
that the funding of these programs was protected would mandate a larger than
normal effect on the budgets of non-protected programs during periods of
budget decline.
Congress contributed to the ineffectiveness of the milestone-authorization
experiment by failing to provide milestone-appropriations to accompany
milestone-authorizations. Finally, Congress failed to provide additional
baseline flexibility to program managers as incentive for the additional risk
taking.
Chapter V extends the analysis of this chapter to determine the viability of
using DEP concepts in the future to accomplish acquisition reform goals.
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V. FUTURE VIABILITY OF DEFENSE ENTERPRISE PROGRAM
CONCEPTS
The Under Secretary should aggressively support Defense
Enterprise Programs as a vehicle for experimental changes
in regulations. Enterprise programs offer a useful
approach for experimenting with alternative regulatory
arrangements.
—Institute for Defense Analysis
[Ref. 2:p. VIII-14]
Chapter IV analyzed the important issues related to DEP implementation
and execution. This chapter explores whether utilization of some of principles
embodied within the DEP is a viable option to improve acquisition efficiency.
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE NEED
1. Regulatory
It is likely that a need will always exist to achieve greater managerial
efficiency in compliance with regulatory requirements. A recent study of the
excessive burden of regulatory reports conducted by the Center for Naval
Analysis (CNA) concluded that:
. . . indeed, the problem is real. Documentation and reporting requirements
impose a significant workload burden. In NAVAIR, for example, nearly 20
percent of the available, in-house man-years and 30 percent of senior
management's time are devoted to the paperwork burden. [Ref. 52:p. iii]
The study also reported that, on average, each program office of each
military department spends roughly two and one-half man-years preparing
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documentation and reports in the life of a program (one man-year equals 2,080
hours of work by one person). [Ref. 52:p. 5] The CNA researchers also
interviewed senior program managers, asking them to estimate the percentage
of their time spent in preparation and review of documents and reports. The
program managers estimated that, not counting internal military department
briefings, POM/budget drills or pre- and post-DAB actions, they spent more
than 16% of their time preparing and reviewing documents and reports. [Ref.
52:p. 61
The regulatory relief pillar of the DEP was designed to reduce burdens
such as those noted above. Implementation of a regulatory reform similar to
the DEP would help eliminate non-value added, non-statutory based
regulations and reduce the costly burden reported by CNA. Elimination of
these regulations could reduce the time and money managers waste on
conforming with unnecessary requirements. It is in this regard that DEP
concepts may still be needed as a "useful approach for experimenting with
alternative regulatory requirements." [Ref. 2:p. VIII-14] Events subsequent to
the original DEP initiative in the late 1980's may have reduced the necessity to
experimentally apply the streamlined management and milestone-to-milestone
funding pillars of the DEP throughout DoD.
2. Streamlined Management
The DoD Inst 5000.series, published nearly one-year after the DEP was
authorized, created the framework for institutionalizing the same streamlined
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reporting chain-of-command concept throughout DoD that was utilized by the
DEP (PM-PEO-SAE-DAE). [Ref. 53:p. 13] Implementation of the DoD Inst
5000.series and DEP-streamlined reporting chains-of-command occurred
concurrently in DoD programs and DEP from 1988 onward. Streamlined
reporting chains-of-command are now in-use throughout DoD for all major
acquisition programs. Because this chain-of-command is now in place, it
obviates the need to continue experimentation with streamlined management
in DEPs.
3. Milestone-to-Milestone Funding
Milestone-authorization is another reform that reduces justification for
revitalization of the DEP. Milestone-authorization did not significantly
improve managerial efficiency partially because milestone-appropriation was
not granted by the House or Senate Appropriations Committees to accompany
DEP milestone-authorization.
The DEP concept of increasing the fiscal stability of acquisition programs
was only partially fulfilled. Milestone-to-milestone authorization alone was
able to provide very little increase in managerial or fiscal efficiency without the
corresponding appropriation. [Ref. 2:p. 62] Program managers were "unable to
make a real 'contracts' for program stability" partly because Congress failed to
provide the complete funding package (authorization and appropriation) that
program managers needed to successfully plan. [Ref. 52:p. 11]
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Interviews with program management and acquisition staff indicated
that, in the reality of program execution, milestone-authorization is worth little
without the milestone-appropriation to accompany it. [Ref. 18, 34, 37, 40]
Congress acknowledged some of the benefits that multi-year funding
provide in the 1986 National Defense Authorization Act. Congress explained
that, "... the programs and activities of [DoD] could be more effectively and
efficiently planned and managed if funds for the Department were provided in
a two-year cycle rather than annually." [Ref. 51 :p. 744] Despite this
acknowledgement, many in the congressional budget process still resisted
implementation of milestone-appropriation of DEPs "since it takes away a
great deal of the annual 'flexibility' of both the legislative and executive
branches." [Ref. l:p. 112]
The Packard Commission dismissed this argument against multi-year
funding, contending that, ". . . national security objectives and priorities,
however, ordinarily do not change appreciably from year to year, nor should
military strategy or the military force structure change radically over a two-
year period." [Ref. 15:p. 25] The Commission further explained that tools were
already in place to provide the flexibility to accommodate unforseen events. It
identified reprogramming, supplemental appropriations and budget
amendment procedures as adequate tools for modification of the budget
available at any time. [Ref. 15:p. 26]
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Despite the logical nature of the arguments presented for and against
providing milestone-appropriation, according to J.R. Fox in The Defense
Management Challenge, "... objections based on political considerations
matter most, and, unfortunately, these are powerful." [Ref. 8:p. 96]
Most of the resistance to supplying milestone-appropriation comes from
Members of the House of Representatives because they are elected for two-
year terms. Proposals to shift to a multi-year funding cycle generates
resistance because it restricts House of Representatives influence and input on
the DoD budget. It is recognized that annual appropriation provides:
. . . powerful tools for controlling the Defense Department. . . .
Because the defense budget represents approximately 65% of the
discretionary spending in the entire federal budget, congressmen advocating
domestic programs would find it unacceptable that in half of the two year
period, defense spending would be untouchable. [Ref. 8:p. 97]
Congressional resistance to providing milestone-appropriation
contributed to the failure of Congress to provide the complete funding package
for milestone-authorized DEPs. [Ref. 16] This was one of many reasons for the
inability of the milestone-authorization concept to achieve successful results in
DEPs.
The following analysis indicates that continued experimentation with
DEP concepts may lead to reduced regulatory requirements allowing program
managers more time to concentrate on management. Subsequent sections of
this chapter analyze congressional support for future DEP experimentation and
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the attitudes within DoD that will ultimately determine the viability of the
DEP to achieve regulatory relief.
B. CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT
The Armed Service Committees of both houses of Congress provided the
majority of congressional involvement with the DEP. Future viability of DEP
concepts will depend on their continued support to lead Congress toward
acceptance of DEP principles.
The Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC) provides the majority of
support for the DEP within Congress. This committee recently called attention
to ineffective DoD utilization of the DEP in their report on the 1992/93
National Defense Authorization Act. DoD was chided for doing:
. . . nothing to implement either Defense Enterprise Programs or the
milestone-authorization process. Notwithstanding the promise in the
Defense Management Review to make greater use of these authorities,
neither of the Department's last two budget requests sought DEP status or
milestone-authorization for any program. The Department has informed the
committee that there are no plans to implement or utilize these provisions to
enhance the management process .... [Ref. 5:pp. 264-5]
This same report also explains congressional repeal of milestone-
authorization for the milestone-authorized DEPs in the FY 1991 National
Defense Authorization Act. The committee explained its disappointment,
noting that milestone-authorized DEPs provided "no benefits, but imposed
additional reporting and management requirements on program managers.
For that reason, the Congress repealed those authorizations." [Ref. 5:p. 265]
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While clearly noting disappointment with DoD execution of the milestone-
authorization pillar of the DEP, the committee reaffirmed its belief that DEP
concepts could provide benefit to DoD. It prodded DoD to reapply the
program explaining that:
. . . repeal [of milestone-authorization] does not reflect a lack of support of
the [DEP] concept, but does reflect a desire not to burden program
managers when the acquisition leadership in the Department will not
implement a needed reform.
The committee continues to believe that the Defense Enterprise Program
concept, milestone-authorization process, and the pilot program authority
have substantial merit, and is prepared to provide the necessary support if
the Department undertakes the administrative action necessary to making
these programs work. [Ref. 5:p. 265]
The House Armed Service Committee (HASC) was minimally involved
with the DEP. [Refs. 16, 54] The interest in the DEP for most House committee
members centered on the milestone-authorization concept because of resistance
to multi-year appropriation. [Ref. 16] HASC members were primarily
responsible for the increase in attention that the milestone-authorization section
of the law received between the bill originally introduced and the final version
of the DEP legislation. [Ref. 16]
Interviews with congressional staff members indicate that a general attitude
of mistrust of DoD acquisition prevailed in the HASC. [Ref. 16] This mistrust
and resistance to multi-year budgeting noted earlier, led HASC members to
require that detailed controls be placed on the milestone-authorization element
of the final DEP legislation. [Ref 16]
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In the end, these controls resulted in the additional burden incurred by
programs that deviated from their baselines. This burden contributed to the
undoing of the milestone-authorization concept by imposing significant
penalties and providing little incentive to offset them. (Chapter IV)
In 1990, members of the HASC introduced a provision in its version of the
FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act to repeal the milestone-
authorization authority granted in the FY 1988/89 Authorization Act. The
SASC authorization proposal for that year tried only to adjust the
authorization levels of these programs to reflect current budget requests. The
Senate proposal was defeated in committee and milestone-authorization of the
four DEPs was rescinded. [Ref. 55:p. 482]
Although the SASC desires to revitalize DEP concepts, this does not
represent the overall "will" of Congress. However, the SASC is very influential
in shaping the policies that guide DoD acquisition. SASC support for DEP
concepts will be vital if DoD decides to pursue them as a tool to increase
managerial or fiscal efficiency of programs in the future.
C. VIABILITY WITHIN DoD
Given that DEP concepts have the support of only one committee in
Congress, albeit a powerful committee, future use depends upon DoD
attitudes. The lack of early DEP success noted previously in this thesis, may
have contributed to doubts by many in the acquisition field about future DEP
viability.
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Interviews with personnel in program management and acquisition offices
generated predominantly cynical and discouraging responses when first
queried about DEPs. A majority of interviewees questioned the utility of
pursuing a "dead" issue and of studying a reform that failed to yield benefits.
This attitude appeared to be prevalent within the DoD acquisition community.
However, some DoD staff believe that DEP concepts do have merit and could
provide benefits to programs in the future.
1. SSN-21 SEAWOLF Success
It may be argued that one DEP experiment produced positive program
benefits overlooked by many critics in DoD. The Navy SSN-21 Seawolf
program manager claimed some managerial and fiscal benefits did result from
designation as a DEP. He reported that his program office:
. . . had been able to utilize the DEP designation to set aside requirements
presumed to apply but in fact of little relevance. DEP designation has
allowed the program manager a ready means of turning aside attempts by
non-decision makers to invoke requirements and changes which rachet the
program toward alleged benefit not commensurate with the cost. . . ." [Ref.
36]
Interviews with SEAWOLF program staff disclosed their ability to "DEP
[waive] the Data Management Review Board" by using their DEP authority
[Ref. 22] They described this board as a "huge ritual" that consumed many
hours of managerial time in preparation and provided limited benefit because
the required data was available in other documents, although in other formats.
[Ref. 22]
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The staff also claimed that status as a DEP enabled their program to
waive Navy regulations on a selective basis. DEP status also reportedly
enabled a "streamlining of their program review" process, primarily at the
Navy level in accordance with the Navy implementation guidance. [Ref. 221
The SSN-21 program manager evaluated his DEP experience as relatively
successful. He stressed that ". . . although the Defense Enterprise Program has
not ushered in the sweeping reforms some might have hoped for, being
designated as a DEP has improved performance of the program's mission in
certain instances." [Ref. 36]
Limited success with the SEAWOLF program allows DEP advocates in
DoD and Congress to claim evidence of managerial and fiscal benefits. Partial
application of DEPs to return benefits in this one program, enables advocates
to question the DoD decision to not continue the DEP to improve program
efficiency.
Staff of the SEAWOLF program office claim that they pursued three
policies that aided successful utilization of the DEP. These three policies are:
1. inform outside agencies of the purpose of the and SEAWOLF program
intended utilization
2. unilaterally assume automatic regulatory waiver
3. selectively apply regulatory waiver authority
The program staff believes that by utilizing these three policies, they
were able to obtain actual benefits and overcome some obstacles to DEP
execution that other programs encountered. [Ref. 22]
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They believed that they encountered little organizational resistance to
employing their waiver authority because they first spent time "educating"
outside offices on their intent. They reported "going public with their intent"
early because there was "no advocacy but their own." [Ref. 22]
The staff remembered that when they were first designated a DEP,
neither OSD nor the Navy had published any guidance on implementation,
(ie., limitations on waiver authority). Therefore, the program manager and
staff began to implement DEP procedures in accordance with the law. [Ref. 22]
This, in the end, was probably the reason they were able to obtain any benefit
at all.
They first informed outside offices of their interpretation of the purpose
and intent of the DEP. They informed the organizations with which they
expected to interact, that they intended to infrequently utilize the special
authority to waive regulatory requirements on only the least useful or non-
applicable regulations to ease apprehension over their powerful waiver
authority. [Ref. 22]
Citing the fact that they encountered only minimal resistance to their
implementation efforts, the staff expressed their belief in interviews that pre-
emptory explanations of DEP authority reduced the apprehension of outside
organizations over their unfamiliarity with the DEP procedures and also the
fear of loss of oversight and control. The staff contends that early and pro-
112
active actions shaped the expectations and broke down barriers to successful
DEP implementation and execution. [Ref. 22]
The staff of the SEAWOLF program acknowledged that selective
application of regulatory waiver authority also contributed to success. They
claimed that relatively infrequent use of waiver ability to set-aside only the
worst, non-value added requirements, through time, led to a reduction in the
apprehension of outside agencies that the SEAWOLF program would "run out-
of-control" because of this reduced oversight. [Ref. 22] The SSN-21 program
manager advocated unilateral assumption of the ability to waive non-statutory
regulations by invoking the DEP charter without inviting discussion. He
believed this assumption "defeated low-level bureaucratic politics " and helped
the Seawolf program achieve successful DEP execution. [Ref. 36] He
hypothesized:
Authority granted to a DEP has been found to be most effective when
the DEP designation is unilaterally invoked, forcing the advocate of a
perceived requirement to have to appeal to a senior decision maker to force
the program to comply. The usual result of this tactic is that either the
advocates don't want to press the case or the senior decision maker chooses
not to support the imposition of the requirement and the issue dies. [Ref.
36]
The ability to obtain some managerial and fiscal benefits from DEP
utilization, claimed by the SEAWOLF program manager and staff, supports
their claim of successful DEP execution. When asked by the Navy SAE if he
wished to relinquish DEP designation, the SEAWOLF program manager,
Admiral Firebaugh, reaffirmed his belief about successful DEP execution and
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responded, "I strongly desire to retain the DEP designation for the SEAWOLF
program." [Ref 36]
Two benefits of the DEP were explained by Admiral Firebaugh in a
memo to the SAE stating his desire to retain DEP designation. He identified
the reduced administrative burden on his program office staff and a non-
specified fiscal saving as benefits caused by eliminating some regulations. He
announced that if DEP designation of the SEAWOLF was removed, ". . .
program office staffing and funding will have to be increased in order to
provide manpower and resources to deal with the increased exposure to non-
statutory requirements." [Ref. 36]
The argument that a reform similar to the DEP may be beneficial to DoD
in the future is supported by the declared success of the SSN-21 program
manager and staff as well as the program manager's desire to retain
designation as a DEP. If implemented in a fashion similar to the SEAWOLF, a
regulatory reform may contribute to an increase in managerial efficiency and
may eventually help reduce the existing regulatory framework of many
unnecessary rules and regulatory requirements.
2. Effects of the Defense Management Review
SECDEF Dick Cheney's Defense Management Report (DMR) specifically
recommended better utilization of DEPs to support experimental
implementation of management-by-exception policies in DoD. SECDEF
Cheney concluded that, "DoD should take better advantage of this special
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Cheney concluded that, "DoD should take better advantage of this special
authority [DEP] than it has to date" [Ref. 38:p. 2]
In discussing the concept of limited reporting requirements, SECDEF
Cheney directed that, "the USD/A, with the SAEs, will carefully select several
new DEPs from programs in the DAB's Concept Approval (post-Milestone I)
phase, provide strong policy direction and oversight in implementing the DEP
concept. . . ." [Ref. 38:p. 12]
Despite the SECDEF mandate to better employ the DEP, little was done
to continue further experimentation with the concept. Chapter IV provides an
analysis of the events that contributed to the USD/A decision not to employ
the DEP in response to the DMR.
The DMR reported that little regulatory reduction occurred since
implementation of the Packard Commission recommendations and laid some
blame for the additional regulatory burden on Congress and DoD. To reduce
the DoD-imposed burden, the DMR chartered the Joint OSD-DoD Component
Regulatory Relief Task Force to conduct a comprehensive, zero-based review
of DoD-level regulations and guidance. Once complete with the DoD-level
review, the task force would proceed with a review of military department
regulations.
In a strong statement designed to ensure the maximum effectiveness of
this zero-based regulatory and guidance review, SECDEF Cheney directed that
this effort:
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... be governed by a strong presumption against retention or duplication of
guidance, absent a clear and compelling need. The burden of establishing
such a need will be placed on the proponent of the guidance in question.
Special scrutiny will be given to guidance that imposes or occasions
unnecessary costs in the acquisition process; that . . . more narrowly
confines the discretion of working levels than is required by law or sound
management control; and that imposes unnecessary reports and reviews on
program offices and contractors. [Ref. 38:pp. 11-12]
After five months of research, the task force released its report in
January 1990. The task for recommended cancellation, combination or revision
and reissuance of:
1. 300 (78%) of 383 DoD directives and instructions reviewed
2. 274 (64%) of 431 DFARS clauses
3. 52,454 (79%) of 66,665 lines of DFARS text;
4. 61 (76%) of 80 Department of Defense Agency contract clauses
5. 23,066 (52%) of 44,057 lines of Department of Defense Agencv text. [Ref.
56:p. 2]
As a consequence of the DMR, regulatory reviews are ongoing to reduce
the volume of regulations in each military department regulatory system.
DMR review of DoD-level regulations has had a broad impact on acquisition
programs. DoD has claimed success in implementing a large number of DoD
directives and instructions into the new DoD Inst 5000.series. [Ref. 37]
Overall, the continuing DoD effort to support the DMR in making the
acquisition process more efficient for all DoD programs poses the greatest
challenge to revitalization of DEP concepts. Personnel in the acquisition
community question the wisdom of pursuing a regulatory reform initiative
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directed at a limited number of acquisition programs (DEP) while they could
be pursuing the DMR directed reforms that apply to all DoD acquisition
programs. [Ref. 33:p. 4] It seems reasonable to assume that a greater savings
in manpower and funding as well as an improvement in managerial efficiency
could result from pursuing the DMR-directed reporting reforms because they
apply to a greater number of DoD programs than the DEP. Interviews
indicated that it was for this reason that the DMR effort was receiving more
attention from personnel in the acquisition community than the DEP. [Refs. 18,
34, 37,]
The DEP was basically overtaken by events. It was a good idea in the
mid-1 980's but, DoD-wide reform of the acquisition system has moved beyond
it.
3. Commercial Practices Pilot Program
The Commercial Practices Pilot Program (CPPP) is a new and
experimental reform similar in nature to the DEP. It was generated from a
specific recommendation in the conclusion of the Defense Management Report
to ". . . demonstrate the advantages of adopting a full range of commercial
style buying practices. . . ." [Ref. 38:p. 20]
In directing DoD to make greater use of commercially available products,
SECDEF Cheney recommended the submission of a legislative proposal to
Congress requesting establishment of pilot programs to emulate the best
principles found in commercial practices. These pilot programs would permit
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certain DoD programs to use the "full range of commercial contracting terms
and conditions when buying commercial products; exempt the acquisition of
commercial products from numerous statutory requirements that otherwise
govern government contracts. . . ." [Ref. 38:pp. B-2-3]
In the initial request for this reform, DoD sought authority to establish
no more that six CPPPs with virtual blanket statutory waiver authority over
requirements such as ". . . price, cost, schedule, performance, management,
oversight, warranties, and socioeconomic requirements of law." [Ref. 58:p. 1931
During 1990 SASC hearings on the 1991 Authorization Act, "... several
members expressed skepticism about the broad waiver authority and
suggested that a detailed justification would be needed before any such
program would be approved." [Ref. 58:p. 193]
In much stronger wording, the SASC seemed reluctant to grant the broad
statutory waiver requested by DoD. In the SASC report on the FY 1991
National Defense Authorization Act it stated "although the committee agrees
that a carefully structured pilot program has the potential for developing
improvements in the acquisition process, the committee does not agree that a
blanket waiver of all statutes without any congressional oversight is necessary
or appropriate." [Ref. 58:p. 193]
The CPPP concept became law within the 1991 National Defense
Authorization Act. [Ref. 57:p. 1593] Despite authorization in law, the
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particulars of execution are still being negotiated between Congress, DoD and
the military departments.
The general concept of this initiative is similar to the DEP attempt to
experimentally grant regulatory relief through broad waiver of regulations.
The CPPP, like the DEP, also relies on the management-by-exception concept
to reduce excessive oversight and reporting requirements. [Ref. 38:p. 20]
The statutory charter of the CPPP is interrelated with the DEP charter. It
specifies concurrent designation as a DEP to achieve regulatory relief of DoD
and military department regulations, while also authorizing the pursuit of
relief from statutory requirements.
However, the CPPP is different than the DEP. Its initiators inadvertently
followed a recommendation of the DEP Working Group ". . . that any attempt
to revitalize the DEP include enough unique characteristics to warrant the
conduct of a separate program." [Ref. 33:p. 3]
The CPPP has the capability to waive statutory requirements that are
approved by Congress on a case-by-case basis. Statutes pertaining to the fiscal
conduct of a program or that limit the authority of the DoD Inspector General
are not eligible for waiver. [Ref. 57:p. 15941
Nearly one-year after Congress authorized the CPPP concept, USD/
A
Yockey designated the following six programs to participate in the CPPP
experiment: the Armored Gun System, Strategic Sealift, Close Range
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV-CR) and the Joint Primary Aircraft Training
System tfPATS). [Ref. 59]
Presently, USD/A Yockey and his staff are close to completing a
determination of which statute waiver requests that were submitted by the
military departments, will be forwarded to Congress for analysis. In the near
future, DoD will present its first requests for statutory waiver to Congress
under the provisions of the CPPP. A draft request has been prepared and
should be forwarded by DEPSECDEF by mid 1992.
In this draft CPPP request, DEPSECDEF Atwood seeks specific statutory
waivers for the Strategic Sealift and JPATS programs. He also outlines the
internal DoD regulatory relief that will be granted to CPPPs. The memo
declares that DoD will treat each CPPP on a management-by-exception basis.
It also dictates that each CPPP adopt a "managerial plan embodying a
streamlined approach that waives all internal DoD policies, directives,
regulations, and administrative rule and guidelines." [Ref. 60:p. 2] It
specifically allows only four executives, the SAEs and USD/A, to designate
regulations that will still apply to designated CPPPs.
These procedures are similar to DEP (without milestone-authorization).
In fact, the draft memo indicates that CPPPs will also be DEP designated to
provide waiver of internal DoD regulations and says, "this approach is
consistent with the designation of pilot programs as Defense Enterprise
Programs." [Ref. 60:p. 2]
120
The procedures written into the existing CPPP legislation authorize
automatic waiver of internal DoD regulations and are essentially the same as
those in the DEP. Therefore, USD/A may choose to disregard DEP
designation and lose nothing by proceeding under the provisions of the CPPP
to bring about virtually the same internal regulatory relief. The intent of
USD/A or SECDEF to disregard the DEP designation is unclear because in the
draft memo, DEP designation is a mandatory requirement for CPPPs. [Ref.
60:p. 2]
However, interviews with USD/A staff indicate that whatever method is
used, USD/A Yockey, with the support of DEPSECDEF Atwood, will
aggressively pursue blanket waiver of regulations and require regulatory
proponents to justify maintenance of every regulation they wish to maintain.
[Refs. 18, 34] [Ref. 60:p. 2]
USD/A is seeking additional authority to further experiment with
management-by-exception principles in DoD acquisition programs by
requesting modification of the CPPP legislation. In the draft request to
Congress seeking the initial CPPP waivers, DEPSECDEF Atwood outlines the
DoD plan to consolidate audit workload and limit audit frequency to specific
annual periods for CPPPs via a memorandum-of-agreement between the DOD
Inspector General and other audit agencies. The memo also requests a similar
arrangement with Congress regarding the GAO to prevent a situation similar
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to one experienced by the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle project when it hosted 37
audits in one year. [Ref. 60:p. 3][Ref. 34]
Also in the draft memo, DoD is requesting modification of the enabling
legislation for the CPPP in an attempt to broaden DoD authority. DoD is
requesting authority to lift the restriction requiring CPPPs to first qualify as
major acquisition programs. DoD argues that smaller programs could also:
. . . benefit substantially from the opportunity to seek selected statutory
waivers; indeed, it has been argued that smaller programs stand to make
major gains in terms of overall efficiency from waivers of statutes
establishing various procurement and contracting restrictions. [Ref. 60:p. 7]
DoD is also asking Congress to amend the enabling statute to permit
CPPPs to pursue statutory waivers that would grant greater financial
flexibility. Current restrictions in the implementing legislation prohibit DoD
from to seeking no-year funding (funds available for obligation with no time
limit).
DoD believes that no-year funding flexibility funds will allow program
managers to manage their programs efficiently:
. . . rather than executing obligation commitments according to arbitrary
budgetary deadlines, PMs could plan obligations in a more prudent and
flexible manner. The availability of 'no-year' funds would reduce the
current incentive to spend money regardless of the immediate need. With
the pressure to obligate appropriated monies before arbitrary budget
deadlines eliminated, Pms could better respond to changing market
conditions and emergence of promising technologies. [Ref. 60:pp. 8-9]
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The burden of acquisition regulation still provides a reason for DoD to
"experiment with alternate regulatory arrangements" similar in intent to the
DEP. [Ref. 2:p. VHI-14] The time recovered from elimination of unnecessary
regulations could be used by program managers to improve managerial
efficiency. The DEP was the leading point of regulatory reform in the late
1980's. At present however, the streamlined management and milestone-
authorization pillars of the DEP do not support the need for revitalization.
In the unlikely event that DoD policy-makers decide to revitalize the DEP,
they can rely on the support of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC).
After chastising DoD for ineffective utilization of the DEP in the past, the
SASC openly pledged its support for the DEP concept in the 1992/93 National
Defense Authorization Act.
At least one DEP, the SSN-21 SEAWOLF, claimed managerial and fiscal
benefits from DEP designation. The DEP concept received an endorsement
from the SEAWOLF program manager who strongly desired to maintain the
DEP designation. He argued that his program office staffing and funding
would have to be increased if DEP designation was revoked.
The SEAWOLF program office reported pursuing three policies that they
hypothesized were the keys to successful DEP implementation and utilization.
The SSN-21 program manager and his staff believe that utilization of these
keys reduced organizational resistance to implementation and lessened
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organizational apprehension about the riskiness of waiving regulations for the
SSN-21 program. These policies were:
1. education of outside agencies regarding the DEP purpose and
implementation
2. unilateral assumption of automatic regulatory waiver
3. selective application of regulatory waiver authority.
SECDEF Cheney's Defense Management Report (DMR) ultimately
eliminated some of the need to revitalize the DEP concepts. It chartered the
Joint OSD-DoD Component Regulatory Relief Task Force to conduct a
comprehensive, zero-based review of DoD and military department regulations
and guidance. Task force efforts resulted in recommendations to cancel,
combine, or revise and reissue a substantial number of DoD-level regulations
and guidelines. This DMR-directed, regulatory relief effort affects many more
programs than the DEP. Because the regulatory relief provided by the DMR
effort applies to all acquisition programs, it reduces the demand for DEP
revitalization.
The Commercial Practices Pilot Program (CPPP) is a reform recently
enacted in law by Congress. The main thrust of the CPPP is regulatory relief.
The CPPP regulatory relief procedures are essentially the same as those of the
DEP, yet go much further. CPPPs have the capability to waive statutory
requirements on a case-by-case basis, after DoD justification and approval by
Congress.
124
Although the CPPP is authorized in law, the specifics of DoD
implementation are still under negotiation. In the near future, DoD will
present its first requests for statutory waiver to Congress under the CPPP
provisions. DEPSECDEF Atwood has assumed the role as advocate for the
CPPP. His intent is to apply blanket regulatory waivers and maintain the
burden of proof for retaining a regulation on its advocate as a part of the
CPPP reform.
It is unclear whether USD/A will allow the CPPP to replace DEP
procedures or instead, rely on them to provide non-statutory regulatory relief
for the CPPPs. If DEP procedures are utilized to provide internal regulatory
relief for CPPPs, the DEP concept will remain a vital part of the DoD
regulatory reform effort.
Future DEPs, should they be designated, may benefit from the high-level
support for the CPPP because of the interdependence of the two programs.
The present climate of support for the CPPP and intent of DEPSECDEF to
reapply blanket regulatory waiver for CPPPs may improve the future viability
of the DEP.
Analysis in this and previous chapters provides the basis for the
conclusions in Chapter VI. Conclusions pertaining to the causes, outcomes and
effects of the DEP are presented in the next chapter.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
"Those who cannot remember the past
are condemned to repeat it"
George Santayana
Life of Reason, Vol. I
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the implementation, and outcomes
of the DEP to determine:
1. What factors contributed to the failure of the DEP to achieve its intended
goals
2. The ultimate impact of the DEP on the defense acquisition process
The DEP was an acquisition reform created by Congress for DoD. It was
the intent of Congress that DoD test management principles that had proven
successful in commercial entities in selected DoD acquisition programs. The
DEP procedures were based on these three pillars:
1. Reducing unnecessary regulatory and reporting requirements
2. Utilizing a streamlined management structure to reduce excessive
oversight
3. Utilizing milestone-to-milestone funding to improve fiscal stability and
managerial efficiency.
Although each pillar of the DEP was related to a specific recommendation
of the highly regarded Packard Commission, the DEP initiative failed to
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achieve its objectives. The DEP initiative exists today, in name only, but offers
little improvement in managerial or fiscal efficiency to designated programs.
A. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Why Hasn't Implementation of the Defense Enterprise Program
Reduced Overregulation and Micromanagement?
The cause for the inability of the DEP to grant benefits may be grouped
into these three broad categories:
1. Technical Failures in Implementation
2. Failure to Address or Consider Organizational Resistance to Reduced
Oversight
3. Political Considerations
a. Technical Failures in Implementation
Analysis of the circumstances and events surrounding DEP execution
indicates that the DEP was unable to provide the relief anticipated because it
was never effectively implemented in DoD programs. A poor implementation
strategy allowed the initiative to deviate from its original intent and delayed or
prevented DEPs from delivering anticipated benefits in a timely fashion.
The method in which the DEP was implemented was the main reason
the initiative failed. DoD and military department interpretations and
adjustments led to a DEP implementation method that did not resemble what
was intended by its initiators. This disconnect is typical of problems that
reform commissions have highlighted in previous studies of DoD acquisition.
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Misinterpretation of congressional intent resulted in the application of
regulations that did not conform to the intent of statute.
The confusing morass of acquisition regulation delayed and reduced
DEP fiscal and managerial benefits. It took the military departments almost
six months (best case) to decipher the existing regulatory framework to
determine which regulations were not based in statute, or the FAR or DFARS
and, therefore, eligible for waiver. The military departments took another six
months to one-year to determine which regulations each would waive.
Unfortunately, the regulations waived produced little benefit because they
were usually duplicated at the DoD level. The end result of this process was
that the vast majority of regulations continued to be applied to the DEPs.
Military departments may have intentionally undermined the DEP as a means
of resisting centralization of acquisition authority in the USD/A, a battle they
eventually lost under the DMR.
DEPs operated for up to one and one-half years without clear
guidance from DoD or the military departments on how to apply the
regulatory relief provisions of the law. The late start in implementing this
pillar of the DEP caused a delay in accrual of regulatory relief for programs.
The guidance that was provided initially served only to confuse managers.
Part of the confusion in implementation resulted from USD/A
redirection of DEP intent. USD/A Godwin ignored the DEP statute that
authorized automatic waiver of DoD regulations by unilaterally altering the
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statutory procedures of the DEP. He required the SAEs to identify each
regulation that would and would not apply to DEPs, and required each
regulatory waiver request to be formally justified. Furthermore, the SAEs had
to include a detailed assessment of the benefits that would be derived from
each waiver.
The change from automatic to justified waiver created a disincentive
to apply the regulatory waiver provision. The burden of proof changed from
the regulation advocate to the DEP advocate. Program managers were too
busy to conduct formal assessments and compose justifications for each
regulation they wished to waive. This led to conservative application of the
regulatory relief provision.
Technical failures also affected the success of the milestone-
authorization pillar of the DEP. The failure of Congress to provide milestone-
appropriation to accompany milestone-authorization resulted in little reduction
in budget justification for programs that were milestone-authorized. Also, the
hardships on program management that resulted from exceeding the budget
baseline outweighed potential benefit especially when considering that no such
penalty existed for non-milestone-authorized programs. Program managers
did not desire the added attention that was required by the baseline deviation
procedures. The additional administrative work that milestone-authorization
entailed was an disincentive for managers to accept DEP designation. In fact,
it led to resentment and resistance.
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b. Failure to Address Organizational Resistance to Reduced Oversight
The DEP initiative failed to become effective because it did not
include a strategy to overcome organizational resistance to reduced oversight
of acquisition programs. Many staff members in the acquisition community
maintained a general attitude that the acquisition system "wasn't broken",
pointing to the overwhelming percentage of transactions that occurred despite
the weaknesses in the system.
Organizational resistance to the DEP hindered implementation by
denying or delaying early benefits. Certain events either caused or manifested
the organizational resistance to reduced oversight. In the end, disincentives for
institutionalizing management-by-exception contributed to the failure of the
DEP. The imposition of a streamlined chain-of-command in the military
department acquisition organization led to development of a parallel or
"shadow" line-of-communication. This developed in response to resistance of
some parts of the organization to a reduction in the existing level of control
and oversight of acquisition programs.
Parochial regulatory advocacy was another manifestation of
organizational resistance to reduced oversight. Advocates of the status quo
came forward at every level to justify the validity and necessity of their
particular regulation or requirement because these requirements protected
them with respect to liability for program failure.
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Each program selected to be a DEP or for milestone-authorization was
a major acquisition program (ACAT I) that attracted significant attention by
virtue of its costliness. The budgetary size of the DEPs also caused significant
resistance to reductions in oversight, especially budgetary oversight. The
potentially large monetary size of errors in these relatively large programs
presented the organization with incentive to embrace oversight protection, to a
much greater extent than if the DEP had been small dollar programs.
Even program managers had an incentive to resist reducing oversight
requirements. Extensive reporting created a sense of shared responsibility for
the program. Superiors granted tacit approval by receiving reports and
briefings and offering no directive to negate or change the information or plan
presented. The ability to reduce individual risk by spreading some small
portion of responsibility to others offered program managers a significant
incentive to resist the streamlining management pillar of the DEP.
Effective high-level advocacy for the DEP could have helped to
overcome some of this organizational resistance to reduced oversight.
However, at the time that the DEPs needed support and advocacy, the USD/A
was preoccupied with trying to establish his own fledgling organization.
Congressional testimony indicates that USD/A Godwin was too busy defining
the new USD/A position, and also might not have been the best choice for the
advocate role. The House Armed Services Committee reported that Mr.
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Godwin lacked experience with DoD acquisition and Pentagon politics. [Ref.
2:p. 11-11]
c. Political Considerations
Political competition, an important aspect of DoD acquisition, was
also a significant contributor to the DEP outcome. Many in Congress
acknowledge the potential fiscal and managerial benefits that fiscal stability
might bring to acquisition programs. However, general congressional
resistance to the multi-year budget process, particularly in the House and
among appropriators in the House and Senate, prevented Congress from
providing milestone-appropriation to accompany milestone-authorization.
This resistance was found primarily in the House of Representatives
because of the two-year tenure of Representatives. The short tenure creates
powerful political considerations that prevented the institution of milestone-
appropriation and the multi-year budget process for the DEP.
The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) primarily involved
itself in the milestone-authorization portion of DEP implementation. An
attitude of mistrust of DoD acquisition in the HASC caused the concept to
regress from the initial stage of genuine trust in DoD acquisition program
management to virtual absence of trust and imposition of detailed and
burdensome provisions in the end. Congress imposed extensive controls on
acquisition programs that were supposed to be relatively free from external
interference.
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Also, Congress maintained the same level of its own oversight
requirements, it directed DoD to implement a reform aimed specifically at
reducing DoD oversight regulatory and reporting requirements. If one
subscribes to the notion that "information is power" then congressional
attempts to reduce the flow of information in DoD was self-serving. Further, a
shadow line-of-communication developed within DoD by necessity to gather
the information needed to answer the increasing number of queries regardless
of reporting waivers granted to DEPs.
A political struggle was taking place within DoD between USD/A
and the military departments. During the time of DEP execution, USD/A
Godwin was attempting to establish the USD/A position as the centralized
"czar" for DoD acquisition. This struggle for power manifested itself in the
DEP with regard to whether USD/A or the military departments had the
authority to determine regulatory waivers for DEPs. This struggle led to
program manager confusion and reluctance to request any regulatory relief.
Program managers also felt the heat of political pressure. They were
attempting to execute programs utilizing the streamlined management
concepts mandated in law, while staffs, sometimes senior in rank or tenure,
fought to maintain existing oversight requirements. Political considerations
such as these caused a conservative application of the DEP provisions, which
ultimately yielded few results.
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The unfortunate absence of benefits in the early years of reform from
1987 to 1991 led to widespread disappointment and loss of interest in the DEP
within the acquisition community. Ultimately, the decline in interest and
attention to the DEP prevented the initiative from ever gaining enough
momentum to overcome bureaucratic inertia in DoD.
2. Is a Congressional "Hands-off ' or Management-by-Exception Program
Possible for the Department of Defense?
Analysis of the evolution of the DEP concept suggests that although
some powerful members and committees within Congress are willing to trust
DoD acquisition management by permitting management-by-exception
procedures, other powerful interests are not so willing. The DEP reform was
directed by Senator Dan Quayle and the Senate Armed Services Committee to
relieve DoD regulations only. This limitation, plus the fact that Congress
failed to provide milestone-appropriation to accompany milestone-
authorization, demonstrates the unwillingness of important decision makers
and staff in Congress to relinquish acquisition control to DoD or to support the
management-by-exception concept.
Chapter HI and IV detail the evolution of the DEP initiative and its
ultimate outcome—the imposition of more rather than less control over DEPs.
The DEP concept regressed from an initial stage of genuine trust in DoD
acquisition program management to virtual absence of trust and imposition of
detailed provisions requiring elaborate procedures for milestone-authorization.
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These procedures caused additional work for DEP managers and created
the risk of automatic and instantaneous loss of fiscal obligational authority to
execute the program. The imposition of extensive controls on acquisition
programs that were supposed to be relatively free from external interference
indicates that, despite the desire of some factions in Congress, as a body it is
not willing to permit true management-by-exception in acquisition programs.
3. Can the Defense Enterprise Program Help to Accomplish Staff
Reductions by Taking Advantage of Reduced Regulatory and
Reporting Requirements?
The fiscal and managerial benefits claimed by the SSN-21 SEAWOLF
program indicates that, when properly implemented, actual regulatory and
reporting relief was obtained as a result of DEP designation. The SEAWOLF
program manager reported reduced administrative burden on his staff and
some fiscal savings as a result of the regulatory and reporting relief provided
by DEP designation. The regulatory and reporting relief provided by the DEP
could allow other program management offices to function at the same level of
effort with a smaller staff because of the absence of administrative burden due
to waived regulations.
4. Is it Feasible to Expect the Defense Enterprise Program to Provide
Relief From Over-regulation and Unnecessary Reporting in the Future?
The analysis in Chapter V suggests that, although the need
for regulatory relief still exists, the DEP will not be revitalized to supply this
relief. Two other reforms, the DMR regulatory relief effort and Commercial
Practices Pilot Program (CPPP) obviate the need for revitalization of the DEP.
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Because the DMR regulatory relief effort has broader applicability than
the narrowly applied DEP, it has attracted more support from the acquisition
community. The DMR regulatory reform is now in progress as part of an
ongoing reform of the DoD acquisition system. The continuous effort to
improve the system reduces the incentive to pursue the DEP which, in itself,
was only minimally effective in reducing regulations for a limited number of
programs.
The Commercial Practices Pilot Program (CPPP) includes virtually all of
the provisions for regulatory relief provided by the DEP, yet it also provides
the capability to request waiver of statutory requirements from Congress. This
is a vast improvement over the DEP concept because it provides the capability
to attack what many feel is the real root of the problem—unnecessary statutory
requirements and regulations. High-level executive support for the CPPP
indicates that the DEP will not be revitalized in the future. Instead, the CPPP
will be used to pursue regulatory relief.
5. How Can the Department of Defense Effectively Accomplish
Implementation if Congress Mandates Utilization of Defense
Enterprise Program Concepts in the Future?
Successful implementation of the DEP concepts by the SSN-21
SEAWOLF program provides an excellent model for the rest of DoD to
emulate if directed to implement the DEP or similar concepts in the future.
SEAWOLF program success highlights the need to employ a planned
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implementation strategy to overcome obstacles and to institute organizational
change.
The SEAWOLF program office reported pursuing three policies that they
believed were the keys to successful DEP implementation and utilization.
These policies were:
1. education of outside agencies regarding the DEP purpose and
implements tion
2. unilateral assumption of automatic regulatory waiver
3. selective application of regulatory waiver authority.
The SSN-21 program manager and his staff believe that utilization of
these keys reduced organizational resistance to implementation and lessened
organizational apprehension about the riskiness of waiving regulations for the
SSN-21 program.
If DoD pursues a reform similar in nature to the DEP, it should employ
similar implementation methods to overcome organizational resistance to
reduced oversight. These methods should include educating the entire DoD
acquisition structure on the goals and intent of the DEP and procedures to
implement the new initiative. The new reform should be able to selectively
challenge non-value added regulations or oversight requirements (not based in
statute). This would result in a relatively infrequent use of waiver authority.
If the claims of the SEAWOLF staff are true, mild utilization of waiver
authority may reduce apprehension of outside agencies and therefore, some of
the resistance within the acquisition organization.
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It must be assumed by all in the acquisition community that any new
reform has the ability to waive all non-statutory regulations for this particular
implementation method to be successful. Whenever a regulation is suspected
by the program management office of being non-value added and challenged,
this assumption would obligate the regulation advocate to justify its continued
application. The experience of the SEAWOLF suggests that, more often than
not, the regulatory waiver will prevail.
In the DEP experiment, regulation advocates were successful maintaining
the applicability of their "parochial" or self-serving requirements.
These efforts to maintain control over programs have been counter-productive
to the regulatory relief effort.
A reform advocate at the USD/A level might help to overcome
organizational resistance to reduced oversight. Such highly-placed advocate
within DoD would keep the momentum and interest in the reform positively
focused and moving forward. If the reform is implemented properly, early
benefits may be used as evidence by reform advocates to support further
attempts to influence the attitudes of the resource decision hierarchy toward
acceptance of reform concepts.
The success of the SEAWOLF program also demonstrates the need for
DoD to establish implementation plans and guidance before any acquisition
initiative is begun in ernest. The SEAWOLF program began implementation
immediately in accordance with the provisions of the law rather than waiting
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for implementing guidance from USD/A. The rapid interpretation and
execution of the law by the SEAWOLF program to some extent eliminated the
need for military department and DoD-level guidance. This helped to reduce
confusion and reluctance on the part of this program manager to aggressively
implement the reform.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The DEP provides an excellent example of the complexity of instituting
reform within DoD. Analysis of the DEP experiment renders conclusions
about effective methods to implement reform in DoD.
First, reforms with different goals and objectives should not be combined.
An initiative focused on one area of reform (ie., regulatory relief) is only
required to overcome one type of resistance. The attempt to make a reform all
things to all people will produce a fate similar to that of the DEP. Second, the
inclusion of milestone-authorization hindered the DEP by generating
additional resistance in Congress over loss of fiscal oversight opportunities by
appropriators who might have otherwise supported the reform.
In all cases, a carefully planned strategy to implement broad scale DoD
reform is essential. A single strategy for all reforms that will be effective in all
instances is impossible to design. However, broad guidelines of this strategy
may be assessed. The initiators of reform must consider methods to facilitate
organizational understanding of the underlying concept and purpose of the
change. The DEP had no strategy in this regard.
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The DEP disconnected between intended and actual implementation and,
therefore, outcomes. If involved early in the conceptualization phase, efforts of
key personnel throughout the acquisition structure might have forged a closer
fit of implementation guidelines to conceptual intent. Future reforms should
employ this technique to avoid disconnecting congressional purpose and DoD
execution.
The strategy for implementing the change must also provide methods and
incentives to modify existing attitudes towards acceptance of the reform within
the organization. Organizational resistance can only be overcome by providing
incentives to accept change. It is also essential to maintain high-level advocacy
to keep the momentum of the reform advancing toward its goal and induce
support for the reform throughout the organization.
The procedural changes unilaterally mandated by USD/A Godwin for DEP
implementation were actually disincentives for effective application of the
DEP. Implementation procedures to obtain the DEP goal required more, rather
than less, additional work by military department and program management
offices. No reform can succeed when this type of approach is used. Incentives
to those who can influence the outcome of the reform must be evident to
induce the desired actions.
It should be understood and accepted by the organization that there will be
some delay in obtaining tangible results from implementation of the reform.
The DEP lost crucial momentum during the early stage of execution because
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no tangible benefits were reported by the participating programs.
Unfortunately, they were designated for over one-year before military
department implementing guidance was issued. Advocates need tangible
results to change perceptions within the organization and generate enthusiasm
for the reform.
The lack of a high-level advocate for the DEP and an absence of early
results due to poor and tardy DoD implementation contributed to the downfall
of the DEP. This outcome indicates that no matter how great the need for a
particular reform, it will not pass the test of implementation on merit alone.
Organizational inertia and the political complexity of the acquisition system
pose obstacles that are difficult to surmount without a strategy that meets the
criteria listed above.
C. AREAS REQUIRING ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
In the future, strategies to implement acquisition reform, similar to the
DEP, require methods to quantify potential benefits. This will require
development of a system to assess the fiscal and managerial impact of
regulatory requirements on efficiency of program management.
The inception of the CPPP initiative provides an opportunity for future
research to compare the outcomes of the CPPP and DEP. The nature of reform
advocacy, perceptions of benefits and impact of organizational resistance are







MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES include improved long-range planning;
greater delegation of responsibility, authority, and accountability; emphasis on
low-risk evolutionary alternatives; more economic production rates; realistic
budgeting and full funding; improved readiness and sustainability; and
strengthening the industrial base.
2. PREPLANNED PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT should be used as a means of
achieving performance growth.
3. MULTI-YEAR PROCUREMENT should be used on a case-by-case basis, to
reduce unit production costs.
4. INCREASED PROGRAM STABILITY IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
should be achieved by fully funding R&D and procurement in order to
maintain the established baseline schedule.
5. ENCOURAGE CAPITAL INVESTMENT TO ENHANCE PRODUCTIVITY
through legislative, contractual, and other economic incentives.
6. BUDGET TO MOST LIKELY COSTS to achieve more realistic long-term
defense acquisition budgets, reduce apparent cost growth, and achieve
increased program stability.
7. ECONOMIC PRODUCTION RATES should be used whenever possible and
advantageous.
8. ASSURE APPROPRIATE CONTRACT TYPE in order to balance program
needs and cost savings with realistic assessment of contractor and government
risk.
9. IMPROVE SYSTEM SUPPORT AND READINESS by establishing objectives
for each development program and "designing-in" reliability and readiness
capabilities.
10. REDUCE THE ADMINISTRATIVE COST AND TIME TO PROCURE
ITEMS by raising the limit on purchase order contracts and reducing
unnecessary paperwork and review.
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APPENDIX A
11. INCORPORATE THE USE OF BUDGETED FUNDS FOR
TECHNOLOGICAL RISK by quantifying risk and incorporating budgeting
techniques to deal with uncertainty.
12. PROVIDE ADEQUATE FRONT-END FUNDING FOR TEST HARDWARE
in order to emphasize early reliability testing and to permit concurrent
development and operational testing when appropriate.
13. GOVERNMENTAL LEGISLATION RELATED TO ACQUISITION which
unnecessarily burden the acquisition or contracting process should be
eliminated.
14. REDUCE THE NUMBER OF DoD DIRECTIVES by performing a cost-
benefit check and requiring that the DAE be the sole issuer of acquisition-
related directives.
15. FUNDING FLEXIBILITY should be enhanced by obtaining legislative
authority to transfer individual weapon system procurement funds to RD,T&E
when appropriate.
16. CONTRACTOR INCENTIVES TO IMPROVE RELIABILITY AND
SUPPORT should be developed and introduced into RFPs, specifications, and
contracts.
17. DECREASE DSARC BRIEFING AND DATA REQUIREMENTS in order to
increase the efficiency of DSARC and other program reviews.
18. BUDGETING WEAPONS SYSTEMS FOR INFLATION should be adopted
in order to more realistically portray program cost.
19. FORECASTING OF BUSINESS BASE CONDITION AT MAJOR DEFENSE
PLANTS by coordinating interservice overhead data and providing program
projections to plant representatives.
20. IMPROVE THE SOURCE SELECTION PROCESS by placing added
emphasis on past performance, schedule realism, facilitization plans, and cost
credibility.
21. DEVELOP AND USE STANDARD OPERATIONAL AND SUPPORT
SYSTEMS to achieve earlier deployment and enhanced supportability with
lower risk and cost.
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22. PROVIDE MORE APPROPRIATE DESIGN-TO-COSTS GOALS to provide
effective incentives during early production runs.
23. ASSURE IMPLEMENTATION OF ACQUISITION PROCESS DECISIONS
by initiating an intensive implementation phase.
24. (ISSUE A) DSARC DECISION MILESTONES should be reduced to
"Requirements Validation" and "Program Go-Ahead."
25. (ISSUE B) MISSION ESSENTIAL NEEDS STATEMENT (MENS) should be
submitted with service POM thus linking the acquisition and PPBS process.
26. (ISSUE C) DSARC MEMBERSHIP should be revised to include the
appropriate service secretary or service chief.
27. (ISSUE D) THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE (DAE) should
continue to be the USDRE.
28. (ISSUE E) THE CRITERION FOR DSARC REVIEW should be increased to
$200 million RDT&E $1 billion procurement in FY 80 dollars.
29. (ISSUE F) INTEGRATION OF THE DSARC AND PPBS PROCESS will be
achieved by requiring that fiscally executable programs be presented for
DSARC review.
30. (ISSUE G) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT RESOURCES will be included in
the service POM by weapon system, and program managers will be given
more control of support resources, funding, and execution.
31. (ISSUE H) IMPROVED RELIABILITY AND SUPPORT for expedited ("Fast
Track") programs will be achieved by requiring an early decision on the
additional resources and incentives needed to balance the risks.
32. INCREASE COMPETITION in acquisition by establishing management







To amend title 10, United States Code, to improve the management of major
defense acquisition programs, to establish a Defense Acquisition Service, and
to limit employment contacts between senior officials of the Department of
Defense and defense contractors.
IN TIDE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
February 20 (legislative day, February 17), 1986
Mr. Quaylr introduced the following bill; which wa.s read twice and referred to
the Committee on Armed Services
A BILL
To amend title 10, United States Code, to improve the manage-
ment of major defense acquisition programs, to establish a
Defense Acquisition Service, and to limit employment con-
tacts between senior officials of the Department of Defense
and defense contractors.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 lives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That this Act may be cited as the "Defense Acquisition En-




1 DEFENSE ENTERPRISE PROGRAMS
2 Sec. 2. (a)(1) Part IV of subtitle A of title 10, United
3 States Code, is amended by inserting after cbapter 131 the
4 following new chapter:
5 CHAPTER 132—DEFENSE ENTERPRISE PROGRAMS
"Sec.
"2221. Definitions.
"2222. Defense enterprise programs; designation and management of programs.
"2223. Defense enterprise program managers.
"2224. Defense enterprise program staff.
"2225. Authorization policy for defense enterprise programs.
6 "§2221. Definitions
7 "In this chapter:
8 "(1) 'Agency' means an agency named in clause
9 (1), (2), (3), or (4) of section 2303(a) of this title.
10 "(2) 'Defense Acquisition Service' means the De-
ll fense Acquisition Service referred to in section 201 of
12 this title.
13 "(3) 'Defense enterprise program' is any major
14 defense acquisition program designated by the head of
15 an agency under section 2222 of this title.
16 "(4) 'Head of an agency' means the Secretary of
17 the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secre-
18 tary of the Air Force.
19 "(5) 'Major defense acquisition program' has the





1 "§ 2222. Defense enterprise programs: designation and
2 management of programs
3 "(a) The head of an agency, with the approval of the
4 Secretary of Defense, may designate any major defense ac-
5 quisition progTam conducted by such agency as a defense en-
6 terprise program.
7 "(b)(1) A defense enterprise program shall be managed
8 by a program manager appointed as provided in section 2223
9 of this title.
10 "(2)(A) A defense enterprise program manager of an
11 agency shall report to and be under the direction, control,
12 and authority of the head of such agency or a designee who
13 meets the requirements of subparagraph (B). A defense enter-
14 prise program manager shall not be subject to or be required
15 to report to any other officer or employee of the agency.
16 "(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), a designee of a
IT head of an agency is an individual who is under the direction,
18 control, and authority of the head of such agency and who
19 reports only to the head of 3uch agency on defense enterprise
20 programs.
21 "(c)(1) A defense enterprise program shall not be subject
22 to any acquisition regulation, policy, directive, or administra-
23 tive rule or guideline relating to the acquisition activities of
24 the Department of Defense other than the Federal Acquisi-
25 tion Regulation and regulations that implement or supple-




1 "(2) Paragraph (1) shall not he construed to limit the
2 application of Federal legislation relating to the acquisition
3 activities of the Department of Defense.
4 "§ 2223. Defense enterprise program managers
5 "(a) The head of an agency conducting a defense entcr-
6 prise program shall appoint a program manager for such
7 program.
8 "(h)(1) The head of an agency shall select a defense en-
9 terprise program manager from among civilian employees of
10 the Defense Acquisition Service who meet the requirements
11 of paragraph (2) or memhers of the armed forces who meet
12 such requirements.
13 "(2) A defense enterprise program manager shall have
14 at least 8 years of experience in acquisition, support, and
15 maintenance of weapon systems.
16 "(3) A memher of the armed forces may he selected to
17 he a defense enterprise program manager without regard to
18 the grade of the memher or any administrative policy relating
19 to the duty assignments of memhers of the armed forces.
20 "(c)(1) The term of appointment of a defense enterprise
21 program manager shall he at least (A) 4 years, or (B) the
22 period heginning on the date of the appointment and ending
23 on the first date (after such date of appointment) on which




1 quisition review council milestone established for the pro-
2 gram, whichever period is shorter.
3 "(2) A defense enterprise program manager of an
4 agency may be removed by the head of the agency only for
5 inadequate performance or to be appointed defense enterprise
6 program manager of a more important or higher priority de-
7 fense enterprise program (as determined by such head of an
8 agency).
9 "(d)(1) Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
10 Defense, each year the person to whom a defense enterprise
1
1
program manager reports pursuant to section 2222(b)(2) of
12 this title shall formally evaluate the performance of such
13 manager.
14 "(2) In evaluating the performance of a manager of a
15 defense enterprise program, the person making the evalua-
16 tion shall take into consideration the extent to which the
17 manager has been able to achieve the objectives of the pro-
18 gram, including quality, timeliness, and cost objectives, and
19 any comments received pursuant to paragraph (3).
20 "(3) Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
21 Defense, each officer or employee of an agency and each
22 member of the armed forces who, except for section
23 2222(b)(2) of this title, would supervise or control the manag-
24 er of a defense enterprise program, receive reports on the




1 prove or disapprove the decisions of such manager in con-
2 ducting the program may submit to the person evaluating
3 such manager comments on the performance of such
4 manager.
5 "§ 2224. Defense enterprise program staff
6 "(a)(1) The manager of a defense enterprise program
7 may establish a senior staff to assist in the management of
8 the program. The manager may select, the members of the
9 senior staff from among members of the Defense Acquisition
10 Service and members of the armed forces.
11 "(2) Members of the armed forces who are selected for
12 positions in the senior staff of a defense enterprise program
13 shall be assigned to such positions without regard to any ad-
14 ministrative policy relating to the assignment of members of
15 the armed forces.
16 "(b)(1) A defense enterprise program manager may ap-
17 point a technical staff, including experts in contracting, audit-
18 ing, testing, and logistics, to enable the manager to manage
19 the program without the technical assistance of another orga-
20 nizational unit of an agency.
21 "(2) A defense enterprise program manager of an
22 agency shall appoint the members of his technical staff from
23 among members of the Defense Acquisition Service, other
24 officers and employees of the agency, and members of any




1 such appointment, as determined by the Secretary concerned.
2 In making determinations of availability for the purpose of
3 this paragraph, the Secretary concerned shall, to the maxi-
4 mum extent practicable, find that persons selected for ap-
5 pointment to a technical staff are reasonably available for
6 such appointment.
7 "§ 2225. Authorization policy for defense enterprise pro-
8 grams
9 "(a) It is the policy of the Congress to authorize at any
10 one time in connection with any defense enterprise program
1
1
the appropriation of sufficient funds to carry out the program
12 through at least one defense systems acquisition review coun-
13 cil milestone established for the program.
14 "(b) The Secretary of Defense shall specify in each au-
15 thorization request submitted to the Congress for a defense
16 enterprise program the amount of funds necessary to carry
17 out the program through at least one defense systems acqui-
18 sition review council milestone established for the program.".
19 (2) The table of chapters at the beginning of part IV of
20 such subtitle is amended by inserting after the item relating
21 to chapter 131 the following new item:
"132. Defense Enterprise Programs 2221".
22 (b) A person may be appointed to a position of defense
23 enterprise program manager or to a position on the senior
24 staff of a defense enterprise program under section 2223(b) or




1 added by subsection (a)(1)), before the date on which the De-
2 fense Acquisition Service referred to in such sections is estnb-
3 lished. The requirement for a person so appointed to be a
4 member of the Defense Acquisition Service (as prescribed in
5 each such section) and the civil service laws relating to the
6 examination and selection of persons for appointment to civil-
7 ian positions in the Federal Government shall not npply to




00 STAT. 3914 PUBLIC LAW 99-661—NOV. 14, 1986
"§ 2436. Defense enterprise programs
"(a) In General.—The Secretary of Defense shall conduct1
through the Secretaries of the military departments, a program
with respect to increasing the efficiency of the management struc
ture of defense acquisition programs by reducing the number of
officials through whom a program manager reports to the senior
procurement executive of the military department concerned.
"(b) Designation of Participating Programs.—The Secretary of
a military department may designate any defense acquisition pro-
gram under the jurisdiction of the Secretary to participate in the
program described in subsection (a). A program designated under
this subsection shall be known as a 'defense enterprise program
"(c) Guidelines.—The Secretary of Defense shall issue guidelines
governing the management of defense enterprise programs. Such,
guidelines shall include the following requirements:
"(1) The Secretary concerned shall designate a program
executive officer for each program.
"(2) The program manager for each program shall report with
respect to such program directly, without intervening review or
approval, to the program executive officer for the programs.
"(3) The program executive officer for a program shall report
with respect to such program directly, without intervening
review or approval, to the senior procurement executive of the
military department concerned designated pursuant to section
16(3) of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.SXT
414(3)).
"(4) The program executive officer to whom a defense enter
prise program manager reports shall evaluate the job perform
ance of such manager on an annual basis. In conducting* an
evaluation under this paragraph, a program executive officer
shall consider the extent to which the manager has achieved the
objectives of the program for which the manager is responsible
including quality, timeliness, and cost objectives.
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"(5) The manager of a defense enterprise program shall be
authorized staff positions for a technical staff, including experts
in business management, contracting, auditing, engineering,
testing, and logistics.
"(d) Applicable Rules and Regulations.—(1) Except as specified
by the senior procurement executive of the military department
concerned, a defense enterprise program shall not be subject to any
regulation, policy, directive, or administrative rule or guideline
relating to the acquisition activities of the Department of Defense
other than the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Department
of Defense supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation.
"(2) Paragraph (1) shall not be construed to limit or modify the
application of Federal legislation relating to the acquisition activi-
ties of the Department of Defense.
"(3) In this subsection the term 'Federal Acquisition Regulation'
has the meaning given such term in section 2320(a)(4) of this title.". 10 USC 2320.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is
amended by adding after the item relating to section 2435 (as added
by section 904) the following new item:
"2436. Defense enterprise programs.".
(b) The Secretary of each military department shall designate for 10 USC 2436
fiscal year 1988 not less than three defense acquisition programs not«-
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary to participate in the program
described in section 2436(a) of title 10, United States Code (as added
by subsection (a)(1)).
SEC. 906. MILESTONE AUTHORIZATION OF DEFENSE ENTERPRISE
PROGRAMS
(a) In General.—(1) Chapter 144 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by adding after section 2436 (as inserted by section 905) the
following new section:
"§ 2437. Defense enterprise programs: milestone authorization 10 USC 2437.
"(a) Designation of Participating Procrams.—(1) The Secretary
of Defense may designate defense enterprise programs in each
military department (as designated by the Secretary of the military
department under section 2436 of this title) to be considered for
milestone authorization under subsection (b).
"(2) The Secretary may designate a defense enterprise program
under paragraph (1) only if the program
—
"(A) is ready to proceed into the full-scale engineering devel-
opment stage or the full-rate production stage: or
"(B) is in either of such stages.
"(b) Submission of Baseline Descriptions.—Not later than the
end of the 90-day period beginning on the date that a defense
enterprise program is designated under subsection (a), the Secretary
of Defense shall—
"(1) in the case of a program that is subject to section 2435(a)
of this title, submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Ante. p. 3913.
Senate and House of Representatives the baseline description
for the program required to be submitted under such section;
"(2) in the case of a program that is not subject to such
section
—
"(A) establish a baseline description that meets the
requirements of such section; and
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"(B) submit the baseline description to such committees;
and
"(3) request from Congress the authority to obligate funds in a
single amount sufficient to carry out the stage for which the
baseline description is submitted.
"(c) Milestone Authorization.—Congress shall authorize funds
for the full-scale engineering development stage or the full-rate
production stage of a program designated by the Secretary of
Defense under subsection (a) in a single amount sufficient to carry
out that stage, but not for a period in excess of five years, if such
program is approved by Congress to
—
"(1) proceed into or complete the full-scale engineering devel-
opment stage; or
"(2) proceed into or complete the full-rate production stage.
"(d) Program Deviations.—(1) If the Secretary of Defense
receives a program deviation report under section 2435(b) of this
title with respect to a defense enterprise program for which funds
are authorized under subsection fb)
"(A) the Secretary of Defense shall notify the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives of
the receipt of such report before the end of the 15-day period
beginning on the date on which the Secretary receives such
report; and
"(B) except as provided in paragraph (2), after the end of the
45-day period beginning on the date on which the Secretary of
Defense receives such report, the Secretary concerned may not
obligate amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to
the Department of Defense for purposes of carrying out the
program.
"(2) Paragraph (1KB) does not apply if the Secretary of Defense
notifies Congress that the Secretary intends to
—
"(A) convene a board to formally review the program: and
"(B) submit to Congress a revised baseline description for the
program and the recommendations of the board convened under
subparagraph (A) concurrent with the submission by the Presi-
dent of the budget for the next fiscal year under section 1105(a)
of title 31.
"(3) The Secretary concerned may not obligate, for the purpose of
carrying out a program described in paragraph (1) for which a
program deviation report is received, amounts appropriated or
otherwise made available to the Department of Defense for the
fiscal year following the fiscal year during which the program
deviation report was received unless such amounts are authorized to
be appropriated after the date on which such report was received.".
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is
amended by adding after the item relating to section 2436 (as
inserted by section 905) the following new item:
"2437. Defense enterprise programs: milestone authorization.".
fb) Initial Designation of Participating Programs.—The Sec-
retary of Defense shall designate for fiscal year 1988 not less than
three defense enterprise programs to be considered for milestone
authorization under subsection (b). The Secretary shall make such
designations as part of the budget submission of the Department of






MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
ATTN: ACQUISITION EXECUTIVES
SUBJECT: OSD Guidance on Defense Enterprise Programs and
Milestone Authorization
The FY 1987 Authorization Act directs that at least three
defense enterprise programs per military department shall be
established for FY 1988. The intent of this concept of
enterprise programs is the reduction of inefficiencies due tc
excessive acquisition regulations and a bulky management
structure. The military departments would manage selected
programs designated as enterprise programs through a
streamlined structure in which the program manager has direct
access to the highest levels of decision makers.
In keeping with this trial streamlining, Congre
authorized the department to utilize the concept of
authorization. Through this process, the Armed Ser
Committees would review high priority programs pric
entering or during full-scale development (FSD) or
production (FRP) and Congress would authorize the n
fund--, in a single amount sufficient to carry the pr
through FSD or FRP (up to 5 years). In order to qu
this approach, a baseline description must be submi
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Th° Secretary of Defense is charged with overseeing aivl
providing guidance for the management of defense enterprise
programs and the designation of milestone authorization
candidates for submission tc Congress along with the FY 1988
aiui subsequent budgets. The military departments are to
suggest candidate milestone authorization programs:
• that are of the highest priority to the military
department, OSD, and the Congress,
• that have the full commitment of all three parties, an
that are relatively stable programs, facing, at most,
limited technical risk.
Candidates that do not
accept ed by (DSD .
meet all these c t i t e r i a will rv^
Fach military department is requested to submit to the JRMB
Execnt ive Secretary at least three candidates for the defense
enterprise program and recommend at least one of those programs




THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE








In response to the Fiscal Year 1987 Authorization Act,
which created the Defense Enterprise Program, I ara designating





















In conjunction with these designations, I request that
milestone authorization be approved for the completion of full-
scale development on the TRIDENT II missile program. I
anticipate also requesting milestone authorization for the
production phase of this program after the Department completes
its Milestone IIIA review in March 1987. The TRIDENT II system
is one of the Department's highest priority programs and will
provide much needed balance to the strategic triad. Milestone
authorization is also requested for the production phase of two
other candidate programs: MSE and MLV. The MSE program will
provide the Army with substantial improvements in the area of
combat support communications. The MLV system is an important
part of the DoD Space Boosters program, designed primarily to
launch Global Positioning System satellites into orbit.
Complete baseline descriptions of these milestone authorization
candidates will be sent to your committee within 90 days.
The Department applauds this congressional initiative to
enhance program stability and believes that the programs
selected are appropriate systems for this unique management
approach.
An identical letter has
Armed Services Committee.






William H. Taft, IV




THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. DC 20301
2 7 APR 1297
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
SUBJECT: Defense Enterprise Program and Milestone Authorization
The attached information establishes general policy
guidelines for the management of defense enterprise programs
and milestone authorization candidates. The following programs
were submitted to the Congress by the Deputy Secretary of















Milestone authorization has been requested for the
following three programs: MSE (Production); TRIDENT II (FSD
and Production); MLV (Production). In accordance with
legislative requirements, please submit baselines for these
milestone authorization candidates to the USD (A) (attn: DAB
Executive Secretary) within 45 days of the date of this
memorandum. In addition, iF~~fs requested that each Service
Acquisition Executive (SAE) clearly identify which regulations,
directives, guidelines, and policies will apply and will not
apply to defense enterprise programs and provide an assessment
of the organizational benefits derived from the regulatory
relief provided enterprise programs. This information should
accompany the above baseline submission.
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GUIDELINES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE DEFENSE ENTERPRISE PROGRAM
Enterprise Programs
Pursuant to statutory requirements and Departmental policy,
enterprise programs shall be managed in' a streamlined manner
(see 10 U.S.C, sec. 2436, enacted by sec. 905 of the FY 1987
Authorization Act). In addition, the legislation waives
regulations, directives, guidelines, and policies relating to
the acquisition activities of the Department of Defense (except
for the FAR and statutory requirements), unless specified
otherwise by the SAE. Accordingly, it is requested that each
SAE identify which regulations, directives, guidelines, and
policies will apply to defense enterprise programs and provide
an assessment of the organizational benefits derived from the
regulatory relief provided enterprise programs. In addition, it
is requested that each SAE clearly identify which regulations
will no longer apply . Although the legislation waives all
regulations, it is imperative that deliberate decisions be made
on the relative importance of each regulation. This information
is required within 45 days of the date of the cover memorandum.
Each SAE is advised that any acquisition program 'designated- as
an enterprise program that is subject to milestone reviews by
the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) shall continue to be subject
to DAB reviews.
Milestone Authorization
All enterprise programs shall be reviewed by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD (A)) to determine
their suitability for milestone authorization. An enterprise
program may be considered for submission to Congress as a
candidate for milestone authorization for full scale development
or full rate production after it has been found by the DAB to be
ready to proceed into either of those stages (or is already in
either of these stages). An enterprise program may also be
considered for a milestone authorization request before it has
been approved by the DAB to proceed into the next milestone,
provided a compelling case for such submission can be made to
the USD (A), who must then approve it. Milestone authorization,
if approved, normally applies to only one acquisition stage at a
t ime.
A baseline description must be submitted to the House and
Senate Armed Services Committees for any defense enterprise
program that is a candidate for milestone authorization. This
baseline must comply with congressional direction (see 10
U.S.C, sec. 2437, enacted by sec. 906 of the FY 1987
Authorization Act). Pursuant to statutory requirements, this
baseline must be submitted to the Secretary of Defense, who is
required to submit it to Congress within 90 days of the
program's designation as a candidate for milestone authorization
(i.e. 30 June 1987 for this year's submission). The Cost
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Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) will be responsible for
validating the cost information in the baseline. The other
aspects of the baseline (i.e. schedule, performance and
configuration) will be reviewed by the OSD staff. In order to
meet the legislative requirement, it is requested that baseline
descriptions for the three programs designated as milestone
authorization candidates be submitted to the USD (A) (attn: DAB
Executive Secretary) within 45 days of the date of this
memorandum.
Once a baseline is approved, any deviations must be reported
immediately by the Program Manager to the Service Acquisition
Executive and Service Secretary. The Service Secretary must
then convene a review panel and submit a report to the USD (A)
within 45 days of the original deviation notification. The
Secretary of Defense is then obliged to notify the House and
Senate Armed Services Committees within 15 days. A formal
review of the program must be held and a revised baseline
submitted to the Congress. If this is not done, obligational
authority for the program in question will be suspended.
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